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In this thesis, we develop decomposition-based approximate dynamic program-
ming methods for problems in capacity allocation and network revenue manage-
ment. Noting that the dynamic programming formulation of these problems suffers
from the “curse of dimensionality”, we demonstrate that a set of single-dimensional
dynamic problems can be employed to provide approximate solutions to the original
dynamic program. We show that the proposed approximations have two impor-
tant characteristics: First, they provide relatively tight performance bounds on the
optimal value of the stochastic optimization problem under consideration. Second,
they give rise to policies that on average perform significantly better than a variety
of benchmark methods found in the literature.
We begin by focusing on network revenue management problems. We assume a
profit maximizing airline operating a network of flight legs and processing itinerary
requests arriving randomly over time. We consider several variants of the basic
model and for each show that the dynamic programming formulation can be de-
composed by flight legs into a set of single-leg revenue management problems.
Furthermore, we demonstrate that the appropriate decomposition method gives
rise to an upper bound on the optimal total expected revenue and that this upper
bound is tighter than the upper bound provided by a deterministic linear program
known from the literature. Finally, computational experiments show that the pol-
icy based on the suggested value function approximation performs significantly
better than a set of standard benchmark methods.
In addition to network revenue management applications, we also consider a
capacity allocation problem with a fixed amount of daily processing capacity. Here,
the decision maker tries to minimize the cost of scheduling a set of jobs arriving
randomly over time to be processed within a given planning horizon. The schedul-
ing (holding) cost of a given job depends on its priority level and the length of its
scheduled waiting period. In this setting, the decomposition approach that we sug-
gest decomposes the problem by booking days. In particular, we replace the orig-
inal dynamic program with a sequence of single-dimensional dynamic programs,
each of which is concerned with capacity limitations on one particular booking day
only. We show that our approach provides tight lower bounds on the minimum
total expected holding cost. Furthermore, it gives rise to a scheduling policy that
on average performs better than a variety of benchmark methods known from the
literature.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
There are countless examples of decision making under uncertainty in real-world
applications. Airlines need to decide whether to sell a given seat on the flight at a
discount or, at the risk of not selling this seat at all, to keep this capacity available
until the departure at a regular price. Hospitals need to decide whether to schedule
a routine MRI test for a low-priority patient at the risk of not being able to serve
a randomly arriving high-priority patient later. A baseball manager has to decide
whether to keep an effective reliever in a close game for another inning at the risk
of not having this pitcher available for the game next day. A common feature
of these problems is that the decision is made while the consequences of each
potential decision are not completely known. Given that each decision is made at
a given time, subject to certain constraints while optimizing a known performance
measure, we can naturally model these problems as dynamic programs. Assuming
xt is the state of the system at the beginning of time period t and Vt(xt) denotes
the maximum revenue that the system can generate starting from state xt at time
period t to the end of the planning horizon, we can establish the optimal action at
time period t by solving the Bellman equation
Vt(xt) = max
at∈At(xt)
E {rt(xt, at, ωt) + Vt+1(Xt+1(xt, at, ωt))} . (1.1)
Here, At(xt) denotes the set of feasible actions at time period t assuming xt the
state of the system, rt(·, ·, ·) the revenue function at time period t, ωt the random
element in the system and Xt+1(·, ·, ·) the state in time period t+ 1.
Aside from the difficulty of taking expectations over potentially unknown distri-
butions, the main challenge with solving equation (1.1) is the (high) dimensionality
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of the state space. In fact, for most practical applications, the size of the state
vector renders solving the Bellman equation above computationally intractable.
This phenomenon is referred to in the literature as the “curse of dimensionality”.
In dynamic programming literature, this difficulty is addressed by proposing
various types of approximation methods. Roughly speaking, we can identify three
main approximation strategies. We note that these are not necessarily mutually
exclusive. The first group of methods tries to simplify the optimization problem
under consideration using techniques such as aggregating the state or decision vari-
ables or eliminating randomness by replacing random variables by their expected
values. An example of this approach in network revenue management setting is
the static deterministic linear program. The obvious problem with this approach
is that it eliminates randomness and hence ignores any local dynamics driven by
the random element in each time period. The second group of methods approx-
imates optimal policies by optimizing over a chosen parametric family of control
policies. For instance, in network revenue management, one can concentrate on
nested protection levels policies only. The problem of this approach is that the
chosen parametric family in general does not include the optimal policy. Finally,
the third strategy is to decompose the original (multi-dimensional) dynamic pro-
gram into a collection of one-dimensional dynamic programs. This thesis builds
on this last stream of literature.
A unifying feature of our decomposition methods is the idea to approximate
the original (multi-dimensional) dynamic programming formulation by decompos-
ing it into a set of one-dimensional dynamic programs. We apply our approach
to problems in capacity allocation and network revenue management. In the net-
work revenue management setting, the decomposition approach can be visualized
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as an effort to allocate revenue generated by selling a given itinerary among all
flight legs associated with this itinerary. Once all itinerary revenues are allocated
among its respective flight legs, we can solve a sequence of revenue management
problems, each taking place over a single flight leg. As a result, we approximate
the original value functions by solving a number of one-dimensional dynamic pro-
grams. Alternatively, the decomposition method approximations can be visualized
as an application of Lagrangian relaxation to the original dynamic programming
formulation. Once the linking constraints in the original dynamic programming
formulation are identified, these constraints are relaxed by associating them with
corresponding Lagrange multipliers.
The organization of this thesis is as follows. In Chapter 2, we develop a rev-
enue management model to jointly make the capacity allocation and overbooking
decisions over an airline network. Our approach begins with the dynamic program-
ming formulation of the capacity allocation and overbooking problem and uses an
approximation strategy to decompose the dynamic programming formulation by
the flight legs. This decomposition idea opens up the possibility of obtaining ap-
proximate solutions by concentrating on one flight leg at a time, but the capacity
allocation and overbooking problem that takes place over a single flight leg still
turns out to be intractable. We use a state aggregation approach to obtain high
quality solutions to the single leg problem. Overall, our model constructs separable
approximations to the value functions, which can be used to make the capacity
allocation and overbooking decisions for the whole airline network. Computational
experiments indicate that our model performs significantly better than a variety
of benchmark strategies from the literature.
In Chapter 3, we develop two methods for making pricing decisions in network
3
revenue management problems. We consider a setting where the probability of
observing a request for an itinerary depends on the prices and the objective is
to dynamically adjust the prices so as to maximize the total expected revenue.
The idea behind both of our methods is to decompose the dynamic programming
formulation of the pricing problem by the flight legs and to obtain value func-
tion approximations by focusing on one flight leg at a time. We show that our
methods provide upper bounds on the optimal total expected revenue and these
upper bounds are tighter than the one provided by a deterministic linear program
commonly used in practice. Our computational experiments yield two important
results. First, our methods provide substantial improvements over the determinis-
tic linear program. The average gap between the total expected revenues obtained
by our methods and the deterministic linear program is 7.11%. On average, our
methods tighten the upper bounds obtained by the deterministic linear program
by 3.66%. Second, the two methods that we develop have different strengths. In
particular, while one method is able to obtain tighter upper bounds, the other one
is able to obtain pricing policies that yield higher total expected revenues.
In Chapter 4, we consider a dynamic capacity allocation problem with a fixed
amount of daily processing capacity. Jobs of different priorities arrive randomly
over time and we need to decide which jobs should be scheduled on which days.
The jobs that are waiting to be processed incur a holding cost depending on their
priority levels. The goal is to minimize the total expected cost over a finite plan-
ning horizon. It is possible to formulate this problem as a dynamic program,
but this formulation quickly gets intractable for practical problem instances. In
this chapter, we propose a dynamic programming decomposition method that ad-
dresses this difficulty. The idea behind our model is to decompose the problem by
booking days and solve a sequence of single-day capacity allocation problems. We
4
show that this approach both can be used to make capacity allocation decisions
and it provides a lower bound on the optimal total expected costs. Computational
experiments indicate that our method performs significantly better than a variety
of benchmark strategies.
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Chapter 2
A Dynamic Programming
Decomposition Method for Making
Overbooking Decisions over an Airline
Network
2.1 Introduction
Capacity allocation and overbooking are two main ingredients of network revenue
management. In particular, capacity allocation deals with the question of which
itineraries to keep open for purchase and which itineraries to close as the remaining
capacities on the flight legs are depleted over time with the customer purchases.
Overbooking deals with the question of to what extent the sales should exceed
the physically available capacity on the flight legs, given that not everyone with a
reservation ends up showing up at the departure time. The capacity allocation and
overbooking decisions are inherently connected. What fare classes to make avail-
able for purchase depends on how many seats in excess of the physically available
capacity the airline is willing to sell. On the other hand, how much to overbook
depends on what itineraries the airline keeps open and the probability that a cus-
tomer who purchases a reservation for one of the open itineraries shows up at the
departure time.
In this chapter, we propose a revenue management model that makes the joint
capacity allocation and overbooking decisions over an airline network. Our ap-
proach formulates the problem as a dynamic program and uses an approximation
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strategy to decompose the dynamic programming formulation by the flight legs.
This decomposition idea opens up the possibility of obtaining approximate solu-
tions by concentrating on one flight leg at a time, though the capacity allocation
and overbooking problem that takes place over a single flight leg still happens to be
intractable. In particular, the state variable in the dynamic programming formu-
lation of the single leg problem involves a large number of dimensions in practical
applications. We overcome this difficulty by using state aggregation to obtain high
quality solutions to the single leg capacity allocation and overbooking problem.
Ultimately, our model provides separable approximations to the value functions,
which can be used to construct a capacity allocation and overbooking policy for
the whole airline network.
Our work in this chapter draws on two streams of literature. The first stream of
literature is the work on dynamic programming decomposition methods in network
revenue management. Dynamic programming decomposition methods date back
to Belobaba (1987) and they are approximate methods aimed at decomposing the
network revenue management problem by the flight legs. The basic idea is to asso-
ciate a displacement adjusted fare with each itinerary over each flight leg, which is
different from the actual fare that the airline charges. The displacement adjusted
fares immediately allow us to solve a sequence of single leg revenue management
problems. In the single leg revenue management problem that takes place over a
particular flight leg, we only concentrate on the remaining capacity on this flight
leg and assume that the fares associated with the itineraries are equal to the dis-
placement adjusted fares over this flight leg. Once we have solved the single leg
problem over each flight leg, we add up the value functions obtained for different
flight legs to obtain separable approximations to the value functions. In this chap-
ter, we use a similar idea to decompose the capacity allocation and overbooking
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problem. The important distinction of our approach is that we explicitly deal with
overbooking, whereas the earlier decomposition methods work exclusively under
the assumption that overbooking is not possible and all reservations show up at
the departure time. Our extension to overbooking is nontrivial and has important
practical implications as overbooking plays a major role in airline operations.
The second stream of literature that we draw on is the work on solving the
capacity allocation and overbooking problem over a single flight leg. This stream
of literature becomes especially useful when we try to solve the single leg capacity
allocation and overbooking problems after decomposing the original problem. As
mentioned above, the single leg capacity allocation and overbooking problem is
intractable, as its dynamic programming formulation involves a high dimensional
state variable. To be able to solve this problem, we build on the approach proposed
by Subramanian, Stidham and Lautenbacher (1999). In particular, we assume that
the proportions of the reservations that we have for different itineraries are fixed
and known. This allows us to keep track of only the total number of reserva-
tions, rather than the number of reservations for each itinerary, in our dynamic
programming formulation. In this case, the state variable in the dynamic program-
ming formulation of the single leg problem collapses to a scalar and the dynamic
programming formulation becomes tractable.
In this chapter, we make the following research contributions. 1) We develop
a model to make the capacity allocation and overbooking decisions over an airline
network. The idea behind our model is to decompose the problem by the flight
legs and to solve a sequence of single leg problems. 2) We show that our approach
provides an upper bound on the optimal total expected profit as long as we can
solve the single leg problems accurately. 3) However, noting that the capacity
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allocation and overbooking problem over a single flight leg is still intractable,
we show how to obtain approximate solutions to the single leg problems in a
tractable manner. 4) Computational experiments indicate that our model performs
significantly better than many of the existing models in the literature.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we review
the other literature that is related to our work. Then, in Section 2.3, we give
a dynamic programming formulation for the capacity allocation and overbooking
problem over an airline network. Section 2.4 gives a simple deterministic linear
program that can be used to develop control policies. In Section 2.5, we describe
our model by using the deterministic linear program as a starting point. Next,
Section 2.6 presents our computational experiments. Finally, in Section 2.7 we
provide concluding remarks.
2.2 Review of Related Literature
Despite the fact that there is substantial literature on capacity allocation over
an airline network, the interaction between capacity allocation and overbooking
is not thoroughly studied. Early models focus on the single leg version of the
problem. Beckmann (1958), Thompson (1961) and Coughlan (1999) develop single
leg capacity allocation and overbooking models under the assumption that the
demands from different fare classes are static random variables. These models
ignore the temporal dynamics of the demand process and their goal is to decide how
many seats to allocate to different fare classes. Later models by Chatwin (1992),
Chatwin (1999) and Subramanian et al. (1999) also consider the single leg problem,
but they try to capture the dynamics of the demand process more accurately.
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Subramanian et al. (1999) note the intractability of the dynamic programming
formulation of the single leg problem and propose the approximation strategy that
we build on in this chapter. It is important to contrast their observation with
the single leg capacity allocation problem without overbooking. If overbooking is
not allowed, then the dynamic programming formulation of the capacity allocation
problem involves a scalar state variable and can easily be solved. Therefore, the
possibility of overbooking, by itself, brings nontrivial challenges even for the single
leg case. Karaesmen and van Ryzin (2004b) describe an overbooking model for
multiple flight legs that operate between the same origin destination pair and can
serve as substitutes of each other.
There are a few papers that consider the overbooking decisions over an airline
network. A popular method to make the capacity allocation decisions in network
revenue management problems is to solve a deterministic linear program. This lin-
ear program is built under the assumption that the itinerary requests are known in
advance and they take on their expected values. There is a constraint associated
with each flight leg in the linear program and the right sides of these constraints
are the leg capacities. Therefore, the optimal values of the dual variables asso-
ciated with these constraints are used to estimate the opportunity cost of a seat
on different flights legs. In this case, one can construct a capacity control policy,
where the fare from an itinerary request is compared with the total opportunity
cost of the capacities that would be consumed by this itinerary request. If the fare
exceeds the total opportunity cost, then the itinerary request is accepted. There
are many variants of the linear programming idea and Section 3.3 in Talluri and
van Ryzin (2004) describes these variants. We do not go into the details of these
variants, as most of them deal only with capacity allocation decisions. However,
Bertsimas and Popescu (2003) show how to build a deterministic linear program
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to deal with overbooking and no shows. We use a variant of their determinis-
tic linear program as a benchmark strategy in our computational experiments.
Karaesmen and van Ryzin (2004a) develop a capacity allocation and overbooking
model, where they compute booking limits by using the optimal objective value of
the deterministic linear program as an estimate of the total expected revenue from
the itinerary requests. Gallego and van Ryzin (1997) provide theoretical support
for the deterministic linear program by showing that the control policy obtained
from a variant of the deterministic linear program is asymptotically optimal as the
leg capacities and the expected number of itinerary requests increase linearly at
the same rate. Kleywegt (2001a) constructs a pricing and overbooking model in
continuous time. The demand process that he uses is deterministic and he utilizes
Lagrangian duality to solve the model.
The literature on decomposition of network revenue management problems is
also related to our work. Williamson (1992) is one of the first to decompose the
network revenue management problem by the flight legs. Her goal is to apply
the expected marginal seat revenue heuristic of Belobaba (1987) on each flight leg
individually to construct value function approximations. Section 3.4.4 in Talluri
and van Ryzin (2004) describes a more refined variant of her approach in the sense
that this variant does not assume that the demand from different fare classes arrive
over nonoverlapping time intervals. Liu and van Ryzin (2008) and Bront, Mendez-
Diaz and Vulcano (2008) show how to extend decomposition methods to address
customer choice behavior among the different itineraries that are available for pur-
chase. Topaloglu (2009) shows that decomposition methods can be visualized as
an application of Lagrangian relaxation to the dynamic programming formulation
of the network revenue management problem. Kunnumkal and Topaloglu (2009a)
show that it is possible to extend the observations of Topaloglu (2009) to address
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the customer choice behavior. There is some recent work on decomposing the ca-
pacity allocation and overbooking problem over an airline network. Erdelyi and
Topaloglu (2009c) use separable functions to approximate the value functions in
the dynamic programming formulation of the capacity allocation and overbooking
problem. In this respect, their paper is connected to our work. However, their
approximations are separable by the itineraries and the number of scalar functions
they keep is equal to the number of possible itineraries. In contrast, our approxi-
mations are separable by the flight legs and the number of scalar functions we keep
is equal to the number of flight legs. The number of flight legs is generally smaller
than the number of itineraries. Furthermore, they use simulation to construct their
scalar functions, whereas we solve small dynamic programs to construct our value
function approximations. We use their model as a benchmark strategy.
There are recent approaches for the capacity allocation problem over an air-
line network. Adelman (2007) uses linear value function approximations for the
capacity allocation problem and he chooses the slopes and intercepts of the value
function approximations by solving a linear program that represents the dynamic
programming formulation of the problem. Zhang and Adelman (2009) extend this
approach to deal with customer choice behavior. They also show that decompo-
sition methods can provide upper bounds on the optimal total expected revenue.
Meissner and Strauss (2008) refine the approach proposed by Adelman (2007) by
using piece-wise linear value function approximations. An important advantage
of the recent approaches is that they provide upper bounds on the optimal total
expected revenue. However, the recent approaches do not address the interaction
between capacity allocation and overbooking and the goal of our paper is to fill
this gap.
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2.3 Problem Formulation
We consider a set of flight legs over an airline network that can be used to serve the
itinerary requests arriving randomly over time. At each time period, an itinerary
request arrives and we need to decide whether to accept or reject this itinerary
request. An accepted itinerary request becomes a reservation, whereas a rejected
itinerary request simply leaves the system. At the departure time of the flight
legs, a certain portion of reservations shows up and we need to decide which of
these reservations should be allowed boarding. The objective is to maximize total
expected profit defined as the difference between the expected revenue obtained
by accepting itinerary requests and the expected penalty cost incurred by denying
boarding to reservations.
The set of flight legs is L and the set of itineraries is J . We note that a flight
leg is referred to as a resource and an itinerary is referred to as a product in some
settings. The problem takes place over the finite planning horizon {τ, . . . , 0}. The
itinerary requests arrive over time periods T = {τ, . . . , 1} and the flights depart
at time period 0. We assume that a time period corresponds to a small enough
time interval that there is at most one itinerary request at each time period. The
probability that there is a request for itinerary j at time period t is pjt. Accepting
a request for itinerary j generates a revenue of fj and this reservation shows up
at the departure time with probability qj. If a reservation for itinerary j shows
up at the departure time and it is denied boarding, then we incur deny penalty
cost of θj. If we allow boarding to a reservation for itinerary j, then we consume
aij units of capacity on flight leg i. The capacity on flight leg i is ci. We assume
that the arrivals of the itinerary requests at different time periods and the show up
decisions of different reservations at the departure time are independent. We also
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assume that the reservations are not canceled over time periods {τ, . . . , 1} and we
do not give refunds to the no shows, but these assumptions are for brevity and one
can make extensions to address cancellations and refunds.
We let xjt denote the total number of reservations for itinerary j at the be-
ginning of time period t so that xt = {xjt : j ∈ J } captures the state of the
reservations. Assuming that the number of reservations for itinerary j at the be-
ginning of time period 0 is xj0, we use Sj(xj0) to denote the number of reservations
for itinerary j that show up at the departure time. Given the assumption that the
show up decisions of different reservations are independent, Sj(xj0) has a binomial
distribution with parameters (xj0, qj). If we use S(x0) = {Sj(xj0) : j ∈ J } to
denote the state of the reservations that show up at the departure time, then we
can compute the penalty cost associated with the denied reservations by solving
the problem
Γ(S(x0)) = min
∑
j∈J
θj wj (2.1)
subject to
∑
j∈J
aij [Sj(xj0)− wj] ≤ ci i ∈ L (2.2)
wj ≤ Sj(xj0) j ∈ J (2.3)
wj ∈ Z+ j ∈ J , (2.4)
where wj is the number of reservations for itinerary j that we deny boarding. The
objective function of the problem above corresponds to the penalty costs associated
with the denied reservations. Constraints (2.2) ensure that the reservations that we
allow boarding do not exceed the leg capacities, whereas constraints (2.3) ensure
that the numbers of denied reservations do not exceed the numbers of reserva-
tions that show up at the departure time. It is important to observe that problem
(2.1)-(2.4) assumes that we can jointly decide which reservations should be denied
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boarding throughout the network and this can be an optimistic assumption. Let-
ting ej be the |J | dimensional unit vector with a one in the element corresponding
to j, we can find the optimal policy by computing the value functions through the
optimality equation
Vt(xt) =
∑
j∈J
pjtmax{fj + Vt−1(xt + ej), Vt−1(xt)}+
[
1−
∑
j∈J
pjt
]
Vt−1(xt) (2.5)
with the boundary condition that V0(x0) = −E{Γ(S(x0))}. In this case, if the
state of the reservations at the beginning of time period t is given by xt, then it is
optimal to accept a request for itinerary j at time period t whenever
fj ≥ Vt−1(xt)− Vt−1(xt + ej). (2.6)
Unfortunately, even for modest sized applications, the state vector xt involves
hundreds of dimensions rendering exact solution to the optimality equation in
(2.5) computationally intractable. In the next section, we begin by describing an
approximate solution method that involves solving a deterministic linear program.
Following this, we build on the deterministic linear program to develop a more
sophisticated approximate solution method.
2.4 Deterministic Linear Program
A standard solution method for the network revenue management problem de-
scribed in the previous section involves solving a deterministic linear program.
This linear program is formulated under the assumption that the arrivals of the
itinerary requests and the show up decisions of the reservations take on their ex-
pected values. In particular, if we let zj be the number of requests for itinerary j
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that we plan to accept over the planning horizon and wj be the number of reserva-
tions that we plan to deny boarding, then this linear program can be formulated
as
max
∑
j∈J
fj zj −
∑
j∈J
θj wj (2.7)
subject to
∑
j∈J
aij [qj zj − wj] ≤ ci i ∈ L (2.8)
zj ≤
∑
t∈T
pjt j ∈ J (2.9)
wj − qj zj ≤ 0 j ∈ J (2.10)
zj, wj ≥ 0 j ∈ J . (2.11)
In the problem above, we assume that if we accept zj requests for itinerary j, then
qj zj reservations for itinerary j show up at the departure time. Constraints (2.8)
ensure that the numbers of reservations that we allow boarding do not exceed the
leg capacities. Constraints (2.9) ensure that the numbers of itinerary requests that
we accept do not exceed the expected numbers of itinerary requests. Constraints
(2.10) ensure that the numbers of denied reservations do not exceed the expected
numbers of reservations that show up at the departure time. The deterministic
linear programming formulation for the network revenue management problem is
widely known under the assumption that overbooking is not possible and all reser-
vations show up at the departure time; see Talluri and van Ryzin (1998). Problem
(2.7)-(2.11) extends this formulation to handle overbooking and no shows. Al-
though this extension is quite intuitive, to our knowledge, Bertsimas and Popescu
(2003) is the only reference to this extension.
One use of problem (2.7)-(2.11) is that its dual solution can be used to construct
a policy to accept or reject the itinerary requests. Letting {λ∗i : i ∈ L} be optimal
values of the dual variables associated with constraints (2.8) in problem (2.7)-
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(2.11), we use λ∗i to estimate the opportunity cost of a unit of capacity on flight
leg i. In this case, if the revenue from an itinerary request exceeds the total
expected opportunity cost of the capacities consumed by this itinerary request or
if the revenue from an itinerary request exceeds the expected penalty cost, then
we accept the itinerary request. In other words, if we have
fj ≥ min
{
qj
∑
i∈L
aij λ
∗
i , qj θj
}
, (2.12)
then we accept a request for itinerary j. The two arguments of the min{·, ·}
operator above capture two effects. If the total expected opportunity cost of the
capacities consumed by a request for itinerary j is small enough that we have
fj ≥ qj
∑
i∈L aij λ
∗
i , then we accept a request for itinerary j. Furthermore, if we
have fj ≥ qj θj, then we can generate revenue, in expectation, simply by accepting
a request for itinerary j and denying boarding to this reservation at the departure
time. We refer to the decision rule in (2.12) as the DLP policy, standing for
deterministic linear program. This decision rule is also used by Bertsimas and
Popescu (2003).
One other use of problem (2.7)-(2.11) is that its optimal objective value provides
an upper bound on the optimal total expected profit. In other words, letting zLP
be the optimal objective value of problem (2.7)-(2.11) and 0¯ be the |J | dimensional
vector of zeros, it is possible to show that Vτ (0¯) ≤ zLP . For future reference, we
state this result as a proposition below. The proof of this proposition can be found
in Erdelyi and Topaloglu (2009c).
Proposition 2.4.1 We have Vτ (0¯) ≤ zLP .
The upper bound in Proposition 2.4.1 can be useful when assessing the opti-
mality gap of a suboptimal decision rule such as the DLP policy in (2.12).
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2.5 Dynamic Programming Decomposition
There are several shortcomings of the deterministic linear program. It only uses
the total expected numbers of the itinerary requests, ignoring the probability dis-
tributions and the temporal dynamics of the arrivals of the itinerary requests.
Furthermore, it assumes that the numbers of reservations that show up at the
departure time take on their expected values. In this section, we build on the de-
terministic linear program to develop a solution method that captures the temporal
dynamics of the itinerary requests somewhat more accurately.
2.5.1 Decomposing into Single Leg Revenue Management
Problems
The starting point for our approach is a duality argument on the deterministic
linear program to decompose the network revenue management problem into a
sequence of single leg revenue management problems. We begin letting {λ∗i : i ∈ L}
be the optimal values of the dual variables associated with constraints (2.8) in
problem (2.7)-(2.11). We choose an arbitrary flight leg i and relax constraints (2.8)
in problem (2.7)-(2.11) for all other flight legs by associating the dual multipliers
{λ∗l : l ∈ L \ {i}}. In this case, linear programming duality implies that problem
(2.7)-(2.11) has the same optimal objective value as the problem
max
∑
j∈J
[
fj − qj
∑
l∈L\{i}
alj λ
∗
l
]
zj −
∑
j∈J
[
θj −
∑
l∈L\{i}
alj λ
∗
l
]
wj +
∑
l∈L\{i}
λ∗l cl
subject to
∑
j∈J
aij [qj zj − wj] ≤ ci
(2.9), (2.10), (2.11).
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We note that the problem above includes the capacity constraint only for flight leg
i. For notational brevity, we let
Λij =
∑
l∈L\{i}
alj λ
∗
l F
i
j = fj − qj Λij Θij = θj − Λij. (2.13)
Omitting the constant term
∑
l∈L\{i} λ
∗
l cl, we write the problem above as
max
∑
j∈J
F ij zj −
∑
j∈J
Θij wj (2.14)
subject to
∑
j∈J
aij [qj zj − wj] ≤ ci (2.15)
(2.9), (2.10), (2.11), (2.16)
in which case, the optimal objective value of problem (2.14)-(2.16) differs from zLP
by
∑
l∈L\{i} λ
∗
l cl.
The decision variables zj and wj do not appear in constraint (2.15) whenever
itinerary j does not use the capacity on flight leg i. This observation allows us
to decompose problem (2.14)-(2.16) into two problems, one of which involves the
itineraries that use the capacity on flight leg i and the other one involves the
remaining itineraries. To this end, we let J i = {j ∈ J : aij > 0} so that J i is
the set of itineraries that use the capacity on flight leg i. In this case, it is easy to
see that the optimal objective value of problem (2.14)-(2.16) is equal to the sum
of the optimal objective values of the problem
max
∑
j∈J i
F ij zj −
∑
j∈J i
Θij wj (2.17)
subject to
∑
j∈J i
aij [qj zj − wj] ≤ ci (2.18)
zj ≤
∑
t∈T
pjt j ∈ J i (2.19)
wj − qj zj ≤ 0 j ∈ J i (2.20)
zj, wj ≥ 0 j ∈ J i, (2.21)
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which involves only the decision variables {zj : j ∈ J i} and {wj : j ∈ J i}, and
the problem
max
∑
j∈J\J i
F ij zj −
∑
j∈J\J i
Θij wj (2.22)
subject to zj ≤
∑
t∈T
pjt j ∈ J \ J i (2.23)
wj − qj zj ≤ 0 j ∈ J \ J i (2.24)
zj, wj ≥ 0 j ∈ J \ J i, (2.25)
which involves only the decision variables {zj : j ∈ J \ J i} and {wj : j ∈
J \ J i}. It turns out that the optimal objective value of problem (2.22)-
(2.25) can easily be obtained by mere inspection. In particular, we show in Ap-
pendix A.1 that the optimal objective value of problem (2.22)-(2.25) is equal to∑
t∈T
∑
j∈J\J i pjt max{F ij , F ij − qj Θij, 0}. Therefore, summing up the discussion
so far in this section, if we let ziLP be the optimal objective value of problem
(2.17)-(2.21), then we have
zLP = z
i
LP +
∑
t∈T
∑
j∈J\J i
pjt max{F ij , F ij − qj Θij, 0}+
∑
l∈L\{i}
λ∗l cl. (2.26)
Comparing problem (2.17)-(2.21) with problem (2.7)-(2.11), we can observe that
problem (2.17)-(2.21) is the deterministic linear program corresponding to a single
leg revenue management problem that takes place over flight leg i. In this single
leg revenue management problem, only the requests for the itineraries in the set J i
are considered. If we accept a request for itinerary j, then we generate a revenue
of F ij . If we deny boarding to a reservation for itinerary j, then we incur a penalty
cost of Θij. Since z
i
LP denotes the optimal objective value of problem (2.17)-(2.21),
Proposition 2.4.1 implies that ziLP provides an upper bound on the optimal total
expected profit for the single leg revenue management problem that takes place
over flight leg i.
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On the other hand, we can compute the optimal total expected profit for the
above described single leg revenue management problem taking place over flight
leg i by solving the corresponding dynamic program. To this end, we introduce
some new notation. We let Ri(·) be the operator that restricts the components
of a |J | dimensional vector to those that correspond to the elements of J i. For
example, we have Ri(xt) = {xjt : j ∈ J i} and Ri(S(x0)) = {Sj(xj0) : j ∈ J i}. In
this case, the optimality equation for the single leg revenue management problem
that takes place over flight leg i reads
V it (Ri(xt)) =
∑
j∈J i
pjtmax{F ij + V it−1(Ri(xt + ej)), V it−1(Ri(xt))}
+
[
1−
∑
j∈J i
pjt
]
V it−1(Ri(xt)) (2.27)
with the boundary condition that V i0 (Ri(x0)) = −E{Γi(Ri(S(x0)))}. Here, Γi(·)
accounts for the penalty cost of denied boarding at the departure time in the single
leg revenue management problem that takes place over flight leg i and it is given
by
Γi(Ri(S(x0))) = min
∑
j∈J i
Θij wj (2.28)
subject to
∑
j∈J i
aij [Sj(xj0)− wj] ≤ ci (2.29)
wj ≤ Sj(xj0) j ∈ J i (2.30)
wj ∈ Z+ j ∈ J i. (2.31)
We recall that ziLP provides an upper bound on the optimal total expected
profit for the single leg revenue management problem that takes place over flight
leg i. This optimal total expected profit is given by V iτ (Ri(0¯)) so that we obtain
V iτ (Ri(0¯)) ≤ ziLP . The next proposition shows the relationship between the so-
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lutions to the optimality equations in (2.5) and (2.27). Its proof is in Appendix
A.2.
Proposition 2.5.1 For all t ∈ T , we have
Vt(xt) ≤ V it (Ri(xt))−
∑
j∈J i
qj Λ
i
j xjt −
∑
j∈J\J i
min
{
qj
∑
l∈L
alj λ
∗
l , qj θj
}
xjt
+
∑
j∈J\J i
t∑
s=1
pjs max{F ij , F ij − qj Θij, 0}+
∑
l∈L\{i}
λ∗l cl. (2.32)
Using Proposition 2.5.1 with t = τ and xt = 0¯, the discussion just before this
proposition implies that
Vτ (0¯) ≤ V iτ (Ri(0¯)) +
∑
j∈J\J i
τ∑
s=1
pjs max{F ij , F ij − qj Θij, 0}+
∑
l∈L\{i}
λ∗l cl
≤ ziLP +
∑
j∈J\J i
τ∑
s=1
pjs max{F ij , F ij − qj Θij, 0}+
∑
l∈L\{i}
λ∗l cl = zLP ,
where the last equality follows from (2.26). Therefore, we can obtain an upper
bound on the optimal total expected profit by solving the optimality equation
in (2.27) and this upper bound is tighter than the one provided by the optimal
objective value of problem (2.7)-(2.11). Nevertheless, the state variable in the
optimality equation in (2.27) has still |J i| dimensions, which can be quite large
for many practical applications. Before we describe one method to approximate
the solution to this optimality equation, we take a quick detour in the next section
and describe how we can use the upper bound in Proposition 2.5.1 to construct a
policy to accept or reject the itinerary requests.
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2.5.2 Approximating the Optimal Decision Rule
Proposition 2.5.1 suggests approximating Vt(xt) with the upper bound given by
the expression on the right side of (2.32). In particular, using V˜ it (xt) to denote the
expression on the right side of (2.32), we can replace Vt−1(xt) − Vt−1(xt + ej) in
the decision rule in (2.6) with V˜ it−1(xt)− V˜ it−1(xt+ ej) and follow this decision rule
to accept or reject the itinerary requests. One ambiguous aspect of this approach
is that the choice of flight leg i is arbitrary and the performance of the proposed
decision rule can depend on the choice of this flight leg. We work around this
ambiguity by computing {V˜ it (·) : t ∈ T } for all i ∈ L so that we can use the average∑
i∈L V˜
i
t (xt)/|L| as an approximation to Vt(xt). Noting that V˜ it (xt) ≥ Vt(xt) for
all i ∈ L, we still have the upper bound that ∑i∈L V˜ it (xt)/|L| ≥ Vt(xt). Thus,
we propose approximating Vt−1(xt) − Vt−1(xt + ej) on the right side of (2.6) by∑
i∈L V˜
i
t−1(xt)/|L| −
∑
i∈L V˜
i
t−1(xt + ej)/|L|. The definition of V˜ it (xt) in (2.32)
implies that
V˜ it−1(xt)− V˜ it−1(xt + ej) =

V it−1(Ri(xt))− V it−1(Ri(xt + ej))
+ qj Λ
i
j if j ∈ J i
min
{
qj
∑
l∈L
alj λ
∗
l , qj θj
}
if j ∈ J \ J i.
Therefore, letting 1(·) be the indicator function, if the state of the reservations at
time period t is given by xt, then we accept a request for itinerary j whenever we
have
fj ≥ 1|L|
∑
i∈L
1(j ∈ J i)
{
V it−1(Ri(xt))− V it−1(Ri(xt + ej)) + qj Λij
}
+
1
|L|
∑
i∈L
1(j ∈ J \ J i) min
{
qj
∑
l∈L
alj λ
∗
l , qj θj
}
. (2.33)
One possible way to look at the decision rule in (2.33) is that each flight leg
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contributes one term to the expression on the right side. If flight leg i is used by
itinerary j, then this flight leg contributes the term V it−1(Ri(xt)) − V it−1(Ri(xt +
ej)) + qj Λ
i
j. If, on the other hand, flight leg i is not used by itinerary j, then this
flight leg contributes the term min{qj
∑
l∈L alj λ
∗
l , qj θj}. The important observa-
tion is that the term min{qj
∑
l∈L alj λ
∗
l , qj θj} is identical to the right side of the
DLP policy in (2.12). Therefore, the flight legs that are not used by itinerary j
do not provide any additional information over what is already provided by the
deterministic linear program. Furthermore, the number of flight legs that are not
used by itinerary j is likely to be substantially larger than the number of flight
legs that are used by itinerary j, which implies that the right side of the expres-
sion above is likely to be dominated by the term min{qj
∑
l∈L alj λ
∗
l , qj θj}. Thus,
one conjectures that the decision rule in (2.33) performs very much like the DLP
policy. A small set of computational experiments confirmed this conjecture.
To overcome this shortcoming, instead of averaging over all flight legs and using∑
i∈L V˜
i
t (xt)/|L| as an approximation to Vt(xt), we average only over the flight legs
that are used by a particular itinerary. In particular, we let Lj = {i ∈ L : aij > 0}
so that Lj is the set of flight legs that are used by itinerary j. In this case,
whenever we need to make a decision for itinerary j, we use
∑
i∈Lj V˜
i
t (xt)/|Lj|
as an approximation to Vt(xt). We note that we still have the upper bound that∑
i∈Lj V˜
i
t (xt)/|Lj| ≥ Vt(xt). Thus, if the state of the reservations at time period t
is given by xt, then we accept a request for itinerary j whenever we have
fj ≥ 1|Lj|
∑
i∈Lj
{
V it−1(Ri(xt))− V it−1(Ri(xt + ej)) + qj Λij
}
. (2.34)
The state variable in the optimality equation in (2.27) has |J i| dimensions.
Theoretically, this is an improvement in comparison to the optimality equation in
(2.5), which involves a state variable with |J | dimensions. Practically, however,
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this improvement is irrelevant as |J i| is on the order of hundreds or thousands
even for modest applications. Therefore, it is still quite difficult to compute the
value functions {V it (·) : t ∈ T } and to use the decision rule in (2.34). In the next
section, we give one method to approximate the value functions {V it (·) : t ∈ T },
which seems to work particularly well for our application context.
2.5.3 Reducing the State Space
In this section, we consider the single leg revenue management problem that takes
place over flight leg i whose dynamic programming formulation is given in (2.27).
Our goal is to approximate the value functions {V it (·) : t ∈ T } by using simple
scalar functions. We observe that the optimality equation in (2.27) has to keep
track of the “identities” of the reservations so that the penalty cost given by the
optimal objective value of problem (2.28)-(2.31) can be computed properly. On the
other hand, if we assume that knowing the total number of reservations is adequate
to compute the penalty cost, then the state variable in the optimality equation in
(2.27) collapses to a scalar. Our approximation builds on this observation and it is
based on approximating the expected penalty cost at the departure time by using
only the total number of reservations.
We begin by introducing some new notation. We use Ai(·) to denote the
operator that adds up the components of a |J | dimensional vector corresponding
to the elements of the set J i. For example, we have Ai(xt) =
∑
j∈J i xjt and
Ai(xt) is the total number of reservations at the beginning of time period t for the
itineraries that use flight leg i. Our approximation is based on the assumption that
if we have a total of Ai(x0) reservations at the beginning of time period 0 for the
itineraries that use flight leg i, then a fixed portion, say αij, of these reservations
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are for itinerary j. In this case, recalling that the random variable Sj(·) captures
the number of reservations for itinerary j that show up at the departure time and
defining the vectors αi = {αij : j ∈ J i}, αiAi(xt) = {αij Ai(xt) : j ∈ J i} and
Si(αiAi(x0)) = {Sj(αij Ai(x0)) : j ∈ J i}, we can approximate the penalty cost at
the departure time by Γi(Si(αiAi(x0))). In this expression, the vector αiAi(x0)
approximates the numbers of reservations that we have at the beginning of time
period 0, whereas the vector Si(αiAi(x0)) gives the numbers of reservations that
show up at the departure time. The function Γi(·) is given by the optimal objective
value of problem (2.28)-(2.31) and it computes the penalty cost for the single leg
revenue management problem that takes place over flight leg i. This approximation
to the penalty cost at the departure time, in turn, allows us to approximate the
solution to the optimality equation in (2.27) by using the solution to the optimality
equation
vit(Ai(xt)) =
∑
j∈J i
pjtmax{F ij + vit−1(Ai(xt + ej)), vit−1(Ai(xt))}
+
[
1−
∑
j∈J i
pjt
]
vit−1(Ai(xt)) (2.35)
with the boundary condition that vi0(Ai(x0)) = −E{Γi(Si(αiAi(x0)))}. We note
that the optimality equation above involves a scalar state variable and it can be
solved quite efficiently.
There are three issues that need to be resolved to be able to find a numerical
solution to the optimality equation in (2.35). The first issue is related to the
choice of αij. We use the DLP policy in (2.12) for this purpose. In particular, we
simulate the trajectory of the DLP policy under M itinerary request realizations.
Letting {xmjt : j ∈ J , t ∈ T } be the state trajectory in the mth itinerary request
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realization, we let
αij =
∑M
m=1 x
m
j0∑M
m=1
∑
˜∈J i x
m
˜0
.
In practice, it is common to use the DLP policy to come up with an average
probability that a reservation shows up at the departure time. Our choice of αij
closely follows this approach.
The second issue arises due to the fact that the argument of Sj(·) in the vector
Si(αiAi(x0)) = {Sj(αij Ai(x0)) : j ∈ J i} is not necessarily integer. We recall that
Sj(xj0) is a binomially distributed random variable with parameters (xj0, qj), but
a binomially distributed random variable with a fractional trial parameter is ill-
defined. We overcome this issue by always visualizing Sj(xj0) as a mixture of two
binomially distributed random variables. In particular, letting b·c be the round
down function, with probability bxj0c + 1 − xj0, Sj(xj0) is equal to a binomially
distributed random variable with parameters (bxj0c, qj), and with probability xj0−
bxj0c, Sj(xj0) is equal to a binomially distributed random variable with parameters
(bxj0c+1, qj). With this convention, if xj0 is integer, then Sj(xj0) continues to be
binomially distributed with parameters (xj0, qj). If, however, xj0 is fractional, then
Sj(xj0) is not necessarily binomially distributed, but its expected value continues
to be (bxj0c+ 1− xj0) qj bxj0c+ (xj0 − bxj0c) qj (bxj0c+ 1) = qj xj0.
Finally, the third issue becomes apparent when we note that the boundary
condition of the optimality equation in (2.35) requires computing the expectation
E{Γi(Si(αiAi(x0)))} over the multi-dimensional random variable Si(αiAi(x0)).
There is no closed form expression for this expectation and we simply approximate
it through Monte Carlo samples.
Once we agree on the resolution of the three issues described above, we can
obtain {vit(·) : i ∈ L, t ∈ T } through the optimality equation in (2.35) and use
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{vit(·) : i ∈ L, t ∈ T } as approximations to {V it (·) : i ∈ L, t ∈ T } in the decision
rule in (2.34). In particular, if the state of the reservations at the beginning of
time period t is given by xt, then we accept a request for itinerary j whenever we
have
fj ≥ 1|Lj|
∑
i∈Lj
{
vit−1(Ai(xt))− vit−1(Ai(xt + ej)) + qj Λij
}
. (2.36)
We refer to this decision rule as the DPD policy, standing for dynamic programming
decomposition.
2.6 Computational Experiments
In this section, we compare the performances of the decision rules in (2.12) and
(2.36), along with other benchmark strategies. We begin by describing the ex-
perimental setup and the benchmark strategies. Following this, we present our
computational results.
2.6.1 Experimental Setup
We consider an airline network that consists of a hub and N spokes. This is a
key network structure that frequently arises in practice. There are two flight legs
associated with each spoke. One of these is from the hub to the spoke, whereas
the other one is from the spoke to the hub. The airline offers a high fare and a low
fare itinerary associated with each origin destination pair. Therefore, the number
of flight legs is 2N and the number of itineraries is 2N (N+1). The fare associated
with a high fare itinerary is κ times the fare associated with the corresponding low
fare itinerary. The penalty cost of denying boarding to a reservation for itinerary
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j is given by θj = δ fj+σ max{f˜ : ˜ ∈ J }, where δ and σ are two parameters that
we change. For request probabilities {pjt : j ∈ J , t ∈ T }, we assume the following
mechanism. First, we assume that for each origin destination pair (o, d), there is a
constant Rod ∈ {0, 1} that denotes the total probability that either one of the two
associated itineraries is requested at any time period. During the duration of the
first third of the booking horizon, i.e. over time periods {τ, . . . , b2
3
τc}, we assume
that the probability of requesting a high fare itinerary is zero while the probability
of requesting a low fare itinerary is equal to the corresponding Rod. Then, in the
remaining time periods, we assume that the probability Rod is linearly transferred
from the low fare itinerary to the high fare itinerary so that in the last time period
the probability of requesting the high fare itinerary is equal to the full value of
Rod. We note that Rod values are generated randomly at the beginning so that
their sum over all origin destination pairs is equal to 1. The probability that a
reservation shows up at the departure time is q and it does not depend on the
itinerary. Noting that the total expected demand for the capacity on flight leg i is
given by q
∑
t∈T
∑
j∈J aij pjt, we measure the tightness of the leg capacities by
ρ =
q
∑
i∈L
∑
t∈T
∑
j∈J aij pjt∑
i∈L ci
.
We label our test problems by (N, κ, δ, σ, q, ρ) and use N ∈ {4, 8}, κ ∈ {4, 8},
(δ, σ) ∈ {(4, 0), (8, 0), (1, 1)}, q ∈ {0.90, 0.95} and ρ ∈ {1.2, 1.6}. This provides
48 test problems for our experimental setup. In all of our test problems, we have
τ = 240. The online supplement provides the data files for all of our test problems.
We describe the format of the data files in Appendix A.3.
It is worthwhile to note that the interaction between κ and (δ, σ) creates in-
teresting situations. For example, when we have κ = 8 and (δ, σ) = (4, 0), if the
revenue associated with a low fare itinerary is f , then the penalty cost associated
with this itinerary is 4f and the revenue associated with the corresponding high
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fare itinerary is 8f . In this case, if we have a request for the high fare itinerary and
a flight leg in this itinerary is already overbooked with a reservation for the low fare
itinerary, then we can still accept the high fare itinerary request and deny boarding
to the low fare reservation to make a net profit of 8f − 4f . This corresponds to
the case where a high fare itinerary trivially preempts the corresponding low fare
itinerary. On the other hand, when we have κ = 4 and (δ, σ) = (1, 1), such preemp-
tions do not occur. We also note that the test problems with (δ, σ) = (1, 1) tend
to have higher penalty costs than the test problems with (δ, σ) = (8, 0), which, in
turn, tend to have higher penalty costs than the test problems with (δ, σ) = (4, 0).
2.6.2 Benchmark Strategies
We compare the performances of the following seven benchmark strategies.
Dynamic programming decomposition (DPD) This benchmark strategy cor-
responds to the DPD policy given by (2.36). We use M = 100 when computing
{αij : i ∈ L, j ∈ J }. We estimate all expectations through 1,000 Monte Carlo
samples. With these settings, the 95% confidence interval for the expectation of
αij has precision ∓4.1% on the average, whereas the 95% confidence interval for
the expected penalty cost incurred at the departure time has precision ∓1.8% on
the average.
Deterministic linear program (DLP) This benchmark strategy corresponds to
the DLP policy in (2.12). The basic variant of this strategy simply solves problem
(2.7)-(2.11) to obtain the optimal values of the dual variables associated with
constraints (2.8) and uses these dual variable to implement the DLP policy. We
use a reoptimized variant of this strategy, where we divide the planning horizon into
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K equal segments and resolve an updated version of problem (2.7)-(2.11) for each
segment. In particular, given that the state of the reservations at the beginning of
the kth segment is xτ(K−k+1)/K , we replace the right hand side of constraints (2.8)
with {ci−
∑
j∈J aij qj xj,τ(K−k+1)/K : i ∈ L}, the right hand side of constraints (2.9)
with {∑τ(K−k+1)/Kt=1 pjt : j ∈ J } and the right hand side of constraints (2.10) with
{qj xj,τ(K−k+1)/K : j ∈ J }, and solve this modified version of problem (2.7)-(2.11).
Letting {λ∗i : i ∈ L} be the optimal values of the dual variables associated with
constraints (2.8), we use these updated values in the decision rule in (2.12) until we
resolve problem (2.7)-(2.11) at the beginning of the next segment. We use K = 20
in our computational experiments.
Finite differences in the deterministic linear program (FDD) Given that
the state of the reservations at the beginning of time period t is xt, FDD approxi-
mates the optimal total expected profit over the time periods {t, . . . , 0} by using
the optimal objective value of the problem
max
∑
j∈J
fj zj −
∑
j∈J
θj wj
subject to
∑
j∈J
aij [qj zj − wj] ≤ ci −
∑
j∈J
aij qj xjt i ∈ L
zj ≤
t∑
t˜=1
pjt˜ j ∈ J
wj − qj zj ≤ qj xjt j ∈ J
zj, wj ≥ 0 j ∈ J .
We denote Lt(xt) the optimal objective value of the problem above and let FDD
use Lt(xt) as an approximation to Vt(xt). In this case, we can make the decisions
by replacing {Vt(·) : t ∈ T } in the decision rule in (2.6) with {Lt(·) : t ∈ T }. This
approach is proposed in Bertsimas and Popescu (2003).
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Similar to DLP, we use a reoptimized version of FDD, where we divide the
planning horizon into K equal segments and retune the decision rule at the begin-
ning of each segment. Given that the state of the reservations at the beginning of
the kth segment is xτ(K−k+1)/K , we compute Lτ(K−k+1)/K(xτ(K−k+1)/K)
−Lτ(K−k+1)/K(xτ(K−k+1)/K+ej) for all j ∈ J . Following the decision rule in (2.6),
if we have
fj ≥ Lτ(K−k+1)/K(xτ(K−k+1)/K)− Lτ(K−k+1)/K(xτ(K−k+1)/K + ej)
then we always accept a request for itinerary j until we reach the beginning of the
next segment and retune the decision rule. We use K = 20.
Virtual capacities based on a naive computation (VCN) In this benchmark
strategy, the airline sets virtual capacities on the flight legs by assuming that the no
shows take on their expected values. Following this, the airline makes the capacity
allocation decisions under the assumption that all of the reservations show up, but
the capacities on the flight legs are equal to the virtual capacities. In other words,
noting that a reservation shows up at the departure time with probability q, the
airline sets the virtual capacity on flight leg i as ui = bci/qc and solves a version
of the deterministic linear program in (2.7)-(2.11), which can be stated as
max
∑
j∈J
fj zj (2.37)
subject to
∑
j∈J
aij zj ≤ ui i ∈ L (2.38)
zj ≤
∑
t∈T
pjt j ∈ J (2.39)
zj ≥ 0 j ∈ J . (2.40)
We denote {λ∗i : i ∈ L} the optimal values of the dual variables associated with the
first set of constraints above and let VCN use the DLP policy in (2.12). Similar
to DLP and FDD, we use a reoptimized version of VCN with 20 reoptimizations.
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Virtual capacities based on an economic model (VCE) One criticism for
VCN is that it chooses the virtual capacities under the assumption that the no
shows take on their expected values. However, depending on the tradeoffs between
the fares, penalty costs and show up probabilities, we may want to be more or less
aggressive than what the expected values of the no shows suggest. The goal of VCE
is to make up for this shortcoming. VCE is proposed in Karaesmen and van Ryzin
(2004a) and it is based on the following three assumptions. First, the revenue that
we make from one unit of capacity on a flight leg is known. We let ri be the revenue
that we make from one unit of capacity on flight leg i. Second, if a reservation uses
the capacities on multiple flight legs, then we can allow boarding to this reservation
on one flight leg, while denying boarding to the same reservation on another flight
leg. Furthermore, the penalty cost of denying boarding to a reservation on a flight
leg is known. We let gi be the penalty cost of denying boarding to a reservation
on flight leg i. Third, if the airline sets the virtual capacity on flight leg i as ui,
then it sells exactly ui reservations on flight leg i.
By the third assumption, if we set the virtual capacity on flight leg i as ui,
then we sell ui reservations on flight leg i, in which case, the first assumption
implies that we generate a revenue of ri ui. On the other hand, if we let Bi(ui) be
a binomially distributed random variable with parameters (ui, q), then the number
of reservations that show up at the departure time is given by Bi(ui) and the
second assumption implies that the expected penalty cost that we incur on flight
leg i is gi E{max{Bi(ui)− ci, 0}}. Therefore, VCE solves the problem maxui ri ui−
gi E{max{Bi(ui)−ci, 0}} to set the virtual capacity on flight leg i. Once the virtual
capacities have been set, VCE proceeds in the same way as VCN.
Karaesmen and van Ryzin (2004a) suggest several choices for ri and gi. Fol-
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lowing their work, we let Rj = fj/
∑
l∈L alj and Gj = θj/
∑
l∈L alj for all j ∈ J
to evenly distribute the revenue and penalty cost associated with an itinerary over
the flight legs that it uses. In this case, we try choosing ri as ri =
∑
j∈J i Rj/|J i| or
ri = max{Rj : j ∈ J i} or ri = min{Rj : j ∈ J i}, and gi as gi =
∑
j∈J i Gj/|J i| or
gi = max{Gj : j ∈ J i} or gi = min{Gj : j ∈ J i}. Using all combinations of these
choices, we have nine different choices for ri and gi. We test the performances of
all of these nine choices for all of our test problems, but for brevity, only report
the results corresponding to the best choice. For different test problems, the best
choice for ri and gi can be different. Similar to VCN, we use a reoptimized version
of VCE with 20 reoptimizations.
Virtual capacities joint with capacity allocation decisions (VCJ) Both
VCN and VCE use the assumption that we can set the virtual capacities first, and
then, come up with a policy to accept or reject the itinerary requests. In contrast,
VCJ uses the penalty cost gi E{max{Bi(ui) − ci, 0}} in problem (2.37)-(2.40) to
jointly set the virtual capacities and come up with a policy to accept or reject the
itinerary requests. In particular, VCJ solves the problem
max
∑
j∈J
fj zj −
∑
i∈L
gi E{max{Bi(ui)− ci, 0}}
subject to
∑
j∈J
aij zj − ui ≤ 0 i ∈ L
zj ≤
∑
t∈T
pjt j ∈ J
zj, ui ≥ 0 i ∈ L, j ∈ J ,
where we use interpolations of the function E{max{Bi(ui) − ci, 0}} to be able to
compute it at a fractional ui. We denote {λ∗i : i ∈ L} the optimal values of the
dual variables associated with the first set of constraints above, and let VCJ use
the DLP policy in (2.12). This approach is proposed in Karaesmen and van Ryzin
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(2004a). Similar to VCE, we try three different choices for gi and report the results
corresponding to the best choice. We use a reoptimized version of VCJ with 20
reoptimizations.
Separable penalty costs (SPC) This benchmark strategy is developed by Erde-
lyi and Topaloglu (2009c). The fundamental observation behind SPC is that if the
penalty cost of denying boarding to the reservations were given by a separable
function of the form Γ(S(x0)) =
∑
j∈J γj(Sj(xj0)), then the optimality equation
in (2.5) would decompose by the itineraries. To exploit this observation, SPC ap-
proximates Γ(S(x0)) in problem (2.1)-(2.4) with a separable function of the form∑
j∈J γj(Sj(xj0)) and solves the optimality equation in (2.5) with the approximate
boundary condition that V0(x0) = −E{
∑
j∈J γj(Sj(xj0))}. The value functions
{Vt(·) : t ∈ T } obtained in this fashion are used to construct a policy to accept or
reject the itinerary requests. SPC uses a simulation based method to construct the
separable approximation
∑
j∈J γj(Sj(xj0)) to the penalty cost. Roughly speaking,
we simulate the DLP policy in (2.12) to have a general idea about the numbers of
reservations that show up at the departure time. Following this, we compute the
slopes of Γ(·) at these numbers of reservations along different directions and use
these slopes to construct the scalar functions {γj(·) : j ∈ J }. An exact descrip-
tion of this benchmark strategy is beyond the scope of this chapter and we refer
the reader to Erdelyi and Topaloglu (2009c) for the details. Similar to the other
benchmark strategies, we retune the separable approximation five times over the
planning horizon. It turns out that retuning SPC more than five times does not
provide any additional benefit.
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2.6.3 Computational Results
Our main computational results are summarized in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. In partic-
ular, these two tables respectively show the results for the test problems with four
and eight spokes. The first column in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 gives the parameters of
the test problem. The second column gives the upper bound on the optimal total
expected profit provided by the optimal objective value of problem (2.7)-(2.11).
The next seven columns give the total expected profits obtained by DPD, DLP,
FDD, VCN, VCE, VCJ and SPC. These total expected profits are estimated by
simulating the performances of the different policies under 50 itinerary request
trajectories. We use common itinerary request trajectories when simulating the
performances of the different policies. The tenth column gives the percent gap
between the total expected profits obtained by DPD and DLP. This column also
includes a “X” whenever DPD performs significantly better than DLP and a “
¯” whenever there is no statistically significant performance gap between the two
methods at 95% level. The next five columns do the same thing as the tenth
column, but they compare the performance of DPD with FDD, VCN, VCE, VCJ
and SPC. Finally, the last column shows the percentage gap between performance
obtained by DPD and the profit bound reported in the second column. The size
of this gap gives an upper bound on the percentage gap between the performance
of DPD and the optimal policy.
The results indicate that DPD performs substantially better than all of the
benchmark strategies that use a linear programming formulation. Among the
linear programming based benchmark strategies, FDD performs the best and it is
followed by VCJ, DLP, VCE and VCN. The superiority of FDD over DLP is also
observed by Bertsimas and Popescu (2003).
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The performance gaps between DPD and DLP, FDD, VCN, VCE and VCJ are
statistically significant for all of the test problems. The average performance gaps
between DPD and DLP, FDD, VCN, VCE and VCJ are respectively 4.09, 2.85,
6.82, 4.76 and 2.82 for the test problems with four spokes. The same gaps increase
to 5.39, 2.87, 8.18, 6.08 and 3.53 for the test problems with eight spokes. The
average percentage gap between the DPD performance and the upper bound from
the deterministic linear program is 5.72 for the test problems with four spokes
and 9.39 for the test problems with eight spokes. Among the three benchmark
strategies that use virtual capacities, VCJ performs better than VCN and VCE.
It is interesting to note that VCJ performs better than DLP as well. There are
test problems where VCN performs better than DLP, despite the fact that VCN is
essentially an ad hoc modification of DLP that does not carefully address the pos-
sibility of no shows. However, the performance of VCN is not robust as indicated
by the test problems with (δ, σ) = (4, 0). There is not a clear distinction between
DLP and VCE, but there are test problems where VCE can perform substantially
worse than DLP.
The performance gap between DPD and SPC is on the order of half a percent
to a percent. We emphasize that a percent revenue difference is still considered
significant in the revenue management setting. On a majority of the test problems,
DPD performs better than SPC and in the remaining test problems, there does not
exist a statistically significant gap between the two benchmark strategies. Similar
to DPD, SPC performs noticeably better than all of the benchmark strategies that
use a linear programming formulation. Therefore, DPD and SPC, by working with
the dynamic programming formulation of the capacity allocation and overbooking
problem, provide significant improvements over using a deterministic linear pro-
gramming formulation, which ignores the temporal dynamics of the arrivals of the
39
itinerary requests.
It is possible to observe a few trends in the performance gaps. In particular,
the performance gaps between DPD and the linear programming based benchmark
strategies tend to increase as the fare difference between the high fare and low fare
itineraries, penalty costs and overall tightness of the leg capacities increase. For test
problems with large fare differences, large penalty costs and tight leg capacities,
the “regret” associated with making an “incorrect” decision is relatively large. For
example, when the fare difference between the high fare and low fare itineraries
is large, accepting a request for a low fare itinerary “incorrectly” may preclude
accepting a request for a high fare itinerary later in the planning horizon and the
revenue forgone in this case can be quite large. Similarly, when the penalty costs
are large, it is costly to deny boarding to a reservation that was accepted “by
mistake”. When the leg capacities are tight, it is important to make the itinerary
acceptance decisions more “carefully”, as it is not possible to accommodate all
itinerary requests. Thus, it is encouraging that a careful stochastic model pays
off and DPD performs significantly better than the linear programming based
benchmark strategies as the fare differences, penalty costs and tightness of the
leg capacities increase. To display some of these trends, Table 2.3 shows the
performance gaps between DPD and the other benchmark strategies averaged over
a number of test problems with a particular characteristic. For example, the
second column shows the performance gaps averaged over the test problems with
four spokes. The trends that we mention can be observed from this table.
Table 2.4 shows the CPU seconds required to compute one set of value function
approximations for DPD and SPC. All of the computational experiments are run
on a Pentium IV desktop PC with 2.4 GHz CPU and 1 GB RAM. Since the
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Table 2.3: Comparison of the performances of DPD and the other benchmark
strategies for different sets of test problems.
Benchmark N κ (δ, σ) ρ
strategies 4 8 4 8 (4,0) (8,0) (1,1) 1.2 1.6
DPD vs. DLP 4.09 5.39 4.26 5.22 1.58 4.59 8.05 3.93 5.55
DPD vs. FDD 2.85 2.87 2.43 3.29 0.85 2.82 4.91 2.54 3.18
DPD vs. VCN 6.82 8.18 5.78 9.22 7.89 7.23 7.38 6.50 8.50
DPD vs. VCE 4.76 6.08 3.98 6.86 5.53 5.30 5.43 4.43 6.41
DPD vs. VCJ 2.87 3.53 2.47 3.93 1.99 3.38 4.21 2.53 4.05
DPD vs. SPC 0.63 0.88 0.83 0.68 0.64 0.87 0.75 0.65 0.86
Table 2.4: CPU seconds for DPD and SPC.
Benchmark N
strategy 4 8
DPD 48 76
SPC 118 220
number of spokes appears to be the primary factor affecting the computation
times, we give the average CPU seconds over different test problems. The two
rows in Table 2.4 show the CPU seconds for DPD and SPC. The second and
third columns respectively correspond to the test problems with four and eight
spokes. The CPU seconds for DPD includes the operations required to estimate
{αij : i ∈ L, j ∈ J } and to compute {vit(·) : i ∈ L, t ∈ T }. The results
indicate that DPD takes significantly less time than SPC and scales more favorably.
Considering its performance, DPD appears to be preferable to SPC. DLP, FDD,
VCN, VCE and VCJ take at most a few seconds to reoptimize their decision rules.
Despite this extra computational burden, the computational requirement for DPD
is still reasonable. Given the substantial improvements that it provides over the
other benchmark strategies, DPD appears to be a viable choice.
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2.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we developed a network revenue management model to jointly make
the capacity allocation and overbooking decisions over an airline network. Our
approach is based on decomposing the network revenue management problem into a
sequence of single leg revenue management problems and exploiting the observation
that if the proportions of the reservations at the departure time were known,
then the dynamic programming formulation of the single leg revenue management
problems would involve only a scalar state variable. Using these observations,
we constructed tractable approximations to the value functions. Computational
experiments demonstrated that the resulting policies perform significantly better
than the benchmark strategies.
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APPENDIX
A Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 Optimal Objective Value of Problem (2.22)-(2.25)
Letting 1(·) be the indicator function and noting constraints (2.24), we note that
the optimal values of the decision variables {wj : j ∈ J \J i} are {1(Θij ≤ 0) qj zj :
j ∈ J \J i}. Therefore, letting [·]+ = max{·, 0}, we can write problem (2.22)-(2.25)
as
max
∑
j∈J\J i
[
F ij + [−Θij]+ qj
]
zj
subject to zj ≤
∑
t∈T
pjt j ∈ J \ J i
zj ≥ 0 j ∈ J \ J i.
In the problem above, the optimal values of the decision variables {zj : j ∈ J \J i}
are {1([F ij + [−Θij]+ qj] ≥ 0)
∑
t∈T pjt : j ∈ J \ J i}. Therefore, the optimal
objective value of the problem above is∑
t∈T
∑
j∈J\J i
[
F ij + [−Θij]+ qj
]+
pjt =
∑
t∈T
∑
j∈J\J i
max{F ij , F ij − qj Θij, 0} pjt.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2.5.1
To simplify the proof, we introduce auxiliary value functions {ψit(·) : i ∈ L, t ∈ T }
by letting
ψit(xt) =
∑
j∈J
pjtmax{F ij + ψit−1(xt + ej), ψit−1(xt)}+
[
1−
∑
j∈J
pjt
]
ψit−1(xt) (A.1)
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with the boundary condition that ψi0(x0) = −E{φi(S(x0))}, where
φi(S(x0)) = min
∑
j∈J
Θij wj (A.2)
subject to
∑
j∈J
aij [Sj(xj0)− wj] ≤ ci (A.3)
wj ≤ Sj(xj0) j ∈ J (A.4)
wj ∈ Z+ j ∈ J . (A.5)
The following two results provide the intermediate steps to prove Proposition 2.5.1.
Lemma A.2.1 For all t ∈ T , we have
ψit(xt) = V
i
t (Ri(xt)) +
∑
j∈J\J i
qj [−Θij]+ xjt +
t∑
s=1
∑
j∈J\J i
pjs max{F ij , F ij − qj Θij, 0}.
Proof of Lemma A.2.1 We show the result by induction over the time periods.
Noting the upper bounds on the decision variables {wj : j ∈ J \ J i} in problem
(A.2)-(A.5), we observe that the optimal values of these decision variables are
{1(Θij ≤ 0)Sj(xj0) : j ∈ J \ J i}. Thus, since we have aij = 0 for all j ∈ J \ J i,
we have
φi(S(x0)) = Γ
i(Ri(S(x0)))−
∑
j∈J\J i
[−Θij]+ Sj(xj0),
where Γi(Ri(S(x0))) is the optimal objective value of problem (2.28)-(2.31). Tak-
ing expectations in the expression above and noting that Sj(xj0) has a bino-
mial distribution with parameters (xj0, qj), we obtain ψ
i
0(x0) = −E{φi(S(x0))} =
−E{Γi(Ri(S(x0)))}+
∑
j∈J\J i qj [−Θij]+xj0 = V i0 (Ri(x0)) +
∑
j∈J\J i qj [−Θij]+xj0
and the result holds for the last time period. Assuming that the result holds for
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time period t− 1, we have
ψit−1(xt + ej)− ψit−1(xt) =

V it−1(Ri(xt + ej))− V it−1(Ri(xt)) if j ∈ J i
qj [−Θij]+ if j ∈ J \ J i.
(A.6)
Therefore, we have
ψit(xt) =
∑
j∈J
pjtmax{F ij + ψit−1(xt + ej)− ψit−1(xt), 0}+ ψit−1(xt)
=
∑
j∈J i
pjtmax{F ij + V it−1(Ri(xt + ej))− V it−1(Ri(xt)), 0}
+
∑
j∈J\J i
pjtmax{F ij + qj [−Θij]+, 0}+ V it−1(Ri(xt))
+
∑
j∈J\J i
qj [−Θij]+ xjt +
t−1∑
s=1
∑
j∈J\J i
pjsmax{F ij , F ij − qj Θij, 0},
where the first equality follows from (A.1) and the second equality follows from
(A.6) and the induction assumption. Since max{F ij+qj [−Θij]+, 0} = max{F ij , F ij−
qj Θ
i
j, 0}, the result follows by collecting the terms on the right side of the expres-
sion above and noting the definition of V it (Ri(xt)) in (2.27). 2
Lemma A.2.2 For all t ∈ T , we have
Vt(xt) ≤ ψit(xt)−
∑
j∈J
qj Λ
i
j xjt +
∑
l∈L\{i}
λ∗l cl.
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Proof of Lemma A.2.2 We show the result by induction over the time periods.
We let {w∗j : j ∈ J } be the optimal solution to problem (2.1)-(2.4). We have
Γ(S(x0)) =
∑
j∈J
θj w
∗
j
≥
∑
j∈J
θj w
∗
j +
∑
l∈L\{i}
λ∗l
{∑
j∈J
alj [Sj(xj0)− w∗j ]− cl
}
=
∑
j∈J
Θij w
∗
j +
∑
j∈J
Λij Sj(xj0)−
∑
l∈L\{i}
λ∗l cl
≥ φi(S(x0)) +
∑
j∈J
Λij Sj(xj0)−
∑
l∈L\{i}
λ∗l cl, (A.7)
where the first inequality follows from the fact that the solution {w∗j : j ∈ J }
satisfies constraints (2.2) and λ∗l ≥ 0 for all l ∈ L\{i}, the second equality follows
from (2.13) and the second inequality follows from the fact that {w∗j : j ∈ J } is
a feasible but not necessarily an optimal solution to problem (A.2)-(A.5). Tak-
ing expectations in the expression above, we obtain V0(x0) = −E{Γ(S(x0))} ≤
−E{φi(S(x0))} −
∑
j∈J qj Λ
i
j xj0 +
∑
l∈L\{i} λ
∗
l cl = ψ
i
0(x0) −
∑
j∈J qj Λ
i
j xj0 +∑
l∈L\{i} λ
∗
l cl and the result holds for the last time period. Assuming that the
result holds for time period t − 1, the induction assumption immediately implies
that
max{fj + Vt−1(xt + ej), Vt−1(xt)} ≤ max{fj + ψit−1(xt + ej)− qj Λij, ψit−1(xt)}
−
∑
j∈J
qj Λ
i
j xjt +
∑
l∈L\{i}
λ∗l cl.
Recalling that F ij = fj − qj Λij, one can combine the inequality above with (2.5)
and (A.1) to obtain the result for time period t. 2
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We are now ready to finalize the proof of Proposition 2.5.1. Lemmas A.2.1 and
Lemma A.2.2 imply that
Vt(xt) ≤ V it (Ri(xt)) +
∑
j∈J\J i
qj [−Θij]+ xjt −
∑
j∈J
qj Λ
i
j xjt
+
∑
j∈J\J i
t∑
s=1
pjsmax{F ij , F ij − qj Θij, 0}+
∑
l∈L\{i}
λ∗l cl.
The result follows by noting that the sum of the second and third terms on the
right side of the expression above can be written as
∑
j∈J\J i
qj [−Θij]+ xjt −
∑
j∈J
qj Λ
i
j xjt
=
∑
j∈J\J i
qj max{−θj + Λij, 0} xjt −
∑
j∈J\J i
qj Λ
i
j xjt −
∑
j∈J i
qj Λ
i
j xjt
= −
∑
j∈J\J i
qj min{θj,Λij} xjt −
∑
j∈J i
qj Λ
i
j xjt
= −
∑
j∈J\J i
min
{
qj θj, qj
∑
l∈L
alj λ
∗
l
}
xjt −
∑
j∈J i
qj Λ
i
j xjt,
where the last equality follows from the fact that Λij =
∑
l∈L\{i} alj λ
∗
l and aij = 0
whenever j ∈ J \ J i.
A.3 Description of the Data Files
The data files that we use in our computational experiments are provided as an
online supplement. The goal of this section is to describe the format of the data
files. All of our data files are labeled as rm A B C.C D.D E.E F.F.txt, where A
corresponds to the number of spokes in the airline network, B corresponds to the
fare difference between a high fare and its corresponding low fare itinerary, C.C
and D.D correspond to the parameters that we use to compute the penalty cost,
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E.E corresponds to the probability that a reservation shows up at the departure
time and F.F corresponds to the ratio of the total expected demand to the total
expected capacity. In other words, following the notation in Section 5.1, A, B,
(C.C, D.D), EE and F.F respectively correspond to N , κ, (δ, σ), q and ρ.
In all of our data sets, we assume that we serve N spokes out of a single hub.
Location 0 corresponds to the hub and locations {1, . . . , N} correspond to the
spokes. The itineraries that connect the hub to a spoke or a spoke to the hub
include one flight leg. The itineraries that connect two spokes include two flight
legs, one from the origin spoke to the hub and one from the hub to the destination
spoke.
Table A.5 shows the organization of the data file for a test problem with τ = 3
andN = 2. The character “#” indicates a comment line and such lines are skipped.
The entries in the five portions of the data file have the following interpretations.
The first portion of the data file shows the number of time periods in the planning
horizon. The second portion of the data file shows the flight legs in the airline
network. The first line in this portion shows the number of flight legs. After
this first line, each line corresponds to one flight leg and shows the origin location,
destination location and capacity of the flight leg. The third portion of the data file
shows the itineraries. The first line in this portion shows the number of itineraries.
After this first line, each line corresponds to one itinerary and shows the origin
location, destination location, fare level, revenue and penalty cost for the itinerary.
Fare level 0 indicates a low fare itinerary and fare level 1 indicates a high fare
itinerary. We emphasize that the itineraries that connect two spokes include two
flight legs, one from the origin spoke to the hub and one from the hub to the
destination spoke. The fourth portion of the data file shows the arrival probabilities
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for the requests for different itineraries.
Table A.5: Organization of the data file for a test problem with τ = 3 and
N = 2.
# beginning of data file
# portion 1
# number of time periods indecision horizon 3
# portion 2
# list of flights [in format origin location, destination location, capacity]
# first line is number of flights
4
1 0 16
2 0 21
0 1 12
0 2 20
# portion 3
# list of itineraries [in format origin location, destination location,
# fare level, revenue, penalty cost]
# first line is number of itineraries
7
0 1 0 24.0 48.0
0 1 1 192.0 384.0
0 2 0 34.0 68.0
1 0 0 192.0 384.0
1 2 0 53.0 106.0
2 1 0 53.0 106.0
2 1 1 212.0 442.0
# portion 4
# list of request arrival probabilities [in format itinerary, probability]
# first entry in each line indicates time period
0 [0 1 0] 0.1 [0 1 1] 0.1 [0 2 0] 0.1 [1 0 0] 0.1 [1 2 0] 0.1
1 [0 1 0] 0.1 [0 1 1] 0.1 [0 2 0] 0.1 [1 0 0] 0.1 [1 2 0] 0.1
2 [0 1 0] 0.1 [0 1 1] 0.1 [0 2 0] 0.1 [1 0 0] 0.1 [1 2 0] 0.1
# portion 5
# list of show up probabilities [in format itinerary, probability]
[0 1 0] 0.9
[0 1 1] 0.9
[0 2 0] 0.9
[1 0 0] 0.9
[1 2 0] 0.9
[2 1 0] 0.9
[2 1 1] 0.9
# end of data file
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Each line in this portion corresponds to a time period in the planning horizon. Each
line first shows an itinerary indicated by the triplet [origin location, destination
location, fare level], followed by the probability that we observe a request for this
itinerary. For example, the probability that we observe a request for the low fare
itinerary from location 2 to 1 at the first time period is 0.2. Since we may not
observe any itinerary arrivals at a particular time period, the probabilities in a
particular line do not necessarily add up to one. The fifth portion of the data
file shows the show up probabilities. Each line in this portion corresponds to one
itinerary. Each line first shows an itinerary indicated by the triplet [origin location,
destination location, fare level], followed by the probability that a reservation for
this itinerary shows up at the departure time.
50
Chapter 3
Using Decomposition Methods to Solve
Pricing Problems in Network Revenue
Management
3.1 Introduction
Capacity allocation has traditionally been regarded as the prevalent control policy
for the network revenue management systems operated by the airlines. In partic-
ular, a capacity allocation policy fixes the prices for the itineraries at prespecified
levels and decides which itineraries to close and which itineraries to keep open for
sale so as to maximize the total expected revenue. It has been argued that the air-
lines are suitable for capacity allocation since their promotion and administrative
needs require them to fix the prices for the itineraries in advance of the sales and a
capacity allocation policy indeed allows them to work with fixed prices. However,
this argument has started to lose its validity with the advent of online sales chan-
nels allowing the airlines to dynamically adjust the prices for the itineraries as the
sales take place. As a result, pricing has started to emerge as a feasible control
policy for the network revenue management systems operated by the airlines.
One of the traditional approaches for making pricing decisions in network rev-
enue management problems is based on a deterministic linear program. This deter-
ministic linear program assumes that the arrivals of the itinerary requests are given
by deterministic functions of the prices. The decision variables correspond to the
numbers of time periods in the planning horizon for which we charge the different
price levels for the itineraries. The deterministic linear program dates back to the
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work of Gallego and van Ryzin (1997) and it has received a lot of attention from
academics and practitioners over the years, but due to its deterministic nature, it
is not able to capture the temporal dynamics of the itinerary requests accurately.
In this paper, we propose two new methods suitable for making pricing deci-
sions in network revenue management problems. In the setting we consider, the
probability of observing a request for an itinerary depends on the prices that we
charge for the itineraries and the objective is to dynamically adjust the prices so
as to maximize the total expected revenue. Both of the methods that we pro-
pose use the deterministic linear program mentioned above as a starting point.
In particular, by using the dual solution to the deterministic linear program, we
first allocate the immediate revenue associated with a certain price level among
the different flight legs. Once we have allocated the immediate revenue associated
with a certain price level among the different flight legs, we can solve a sequence
of revenue management problems, each taking place over a single flight leg. In the
single leg revenue management problem that takes place over a particular flight
leg, if we charge a certain price level for a certain itinerary, then the revenue that
we obtain is given by the portion of the price level that is allocated to the flight
leg. By solving the dynamic programming formulation of the single leg revenue
management problem for each flight leg, we obtain a value function from each one
of the flight legs, in which case, we sum up these value functions to obtain a value
function approximation for the original network revenue management problem. Ul-
timately, both of the methods that we propose construct separable approximations
to the value functions.
The methods that we propose in this paper provide advantages when compared
with the deterministic linear program. To begin with, since our methods use dy-
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namic programming formulations for the single leg revenue management problems,
they are likely to capture the temporal dynamics of the itinerary requests more
accurately than the deterministic linear program. In addition, it is possible to
show that the deterministic linear program provides an upper bound on the total
expected revenue obtained by the optimal control policy. Such upper bounds be-
come useful when we assess the optimality gap of a suboptimal control policy. We
show that our methods also obtain upper bounds on the optimal total expected
revenue and the upper bounds obtained by our methods are provably tighter than
those from the deterministic linear program. Finally, our computational experi-
ments demonstrate that the two methods that we propose can provide substantial
improvements over the deterministic linear program. Averaging over all of the test
problems in our experimental setup, we observe that the gap between the total
expected revenues obtained by our methods and the deterministic linear program
is 7.11%, whereas the gap between the upper bounds obtained by our methods and
the deterministic linear program is 3.66%.
The basic idea behind the two methods that we propose is to decompose the
pricing problem over an airline network by the flight legs and to obtain value
function approximations by solving a sequence of single leg revenue management
problems. Therefore, our methods can be visualized as dynamic programming
decomposition approaches. There are some other dynamic programming decom-
position approaches in the literature that try to construct good control policies by
focusing on one flight leg at a time. However, these approaches exclusively use
capacity control policies, whereas our focus is on pricing. To our knowledge, there
are few practical algorithms for pricing and the transition from capacity control to
pricing is nontrivial and practically important. Zhang and Adelman (2009) were
the first to show that a dynamic programming decomposition approach can pro-
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vide upper bounds on the optimal total expected revenue in the capacity allocation
setting. Liu and van Ryzin (2008) use dynamic programming decomposition ap-
proaches to model customer choice behavior, where each customer observes the set
of itineraries that are available for sale and makes a choice among them. Topaloglu
(2009) demonstrates that it is possible to develop dynamic programming decom-
position approaches by using a suitable Lagrangian relaxation argument on the
dynamic programming formulation of a capacity allocation problem. Erdelyi and
Topaloglu (2009b) follow a dynamic programming decomposition idea to develop
a joint capacity allocation and overbooking model.
Although pricing is a fundamental control mechanism in network revenue man-
agement, most of the pricing papers in the literature focus on pricing a single
product in isolation, whereas the network revenue management setting requires
pricing multiple itineraries that interact with each other. Gallego and van Ryzin
(1994) analyze the problem of dynamically adjusting the price of a single product
and characterize the form of the optimal policy. They also show that a single price
policy is asymptotically optimal as the initial inventory of the product and the
length of the selling horizon increases linearly at the same rate. Feng and Gallego
(2000), Feng and Xiao (2000) and Zhao and Zheng (2000) extend the analysis in
Gallego and van Ryzin (1994) to incorporate more complicated demand dynamics
and pricing constraints. Feng and Gallego (1995) consider the case where the price
of a product can be adjusted only once, either from high to low or from low to high.
They characterize the optimal timing of the price change. Maglaras and Meissner
(2006) establish that certain pricing problems can be converted into equivalent
capacity allocation problems and this result immediately allows them to extend
the structural properties for capacity allocation problems to pricing problems.
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The literature is thinner when we focus on pricing over an airline network.
Gallego and van Ryzin (1997) propose a deterministic optimization problem for
pricing multiple itineraries that interact with each other. They show that the pric-
ing decisions made by this deterministic optimization problem are asymptotically
optimal in the same sense as in Gallego and van Ryzin (1994). We use a variant of
their approach as a benchmark strategy in our computational experiments. Kley-
wegt (2001b) develops a joint pricing and overbooking model, where the itinerary
requests are deterministic functions of the prices and he solves the model by using
Lagrangian duality arguments. Zhang and Cooper (2006) consider the problem of
pricing substitutable flights that operate between the same origin destination pair.
They build upper and lower bounds on the value functions and use these bounds
to construct pricing policies, but their approach does not appear to extend to a
general airline network. Kunnumkal and Topaloglu (2009b) propose a stochastic
approximation algorithm for making pricing decisions over an airline network. The
review papers by McGill and van Ryzin (1999), Bitran and Caldentey (2003) and
Elmaghraby and Keskinocak (2003) and the book by Talluri and van Ryzin (2004)
provide extensive coverage of pricing models in network revenue management.
In this paper, we make the following research contributions. 1) We develop two
methods for making pricing decisions in network revenue management problems.
Our methods are based on decomposing the pricing problem over an airline network
by the flight legs and obtaining value function approximations by focusing on one
flight leg at a time. Since our methods use dynamic programming formulations,
they capture the temporal dynamics of the itinerary requests more accurately than
the deterministic linear program mentioned above. 2) We show that both of our
methods provide upper bounds on the total expected revenue obtained by the opti-
mal control policy. It is possible to show that the deterministic linear program also
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provides such an upper bound, but the upper bounds provided by our methods are
provably tighter than those provided by the deterministic linear program. 3) Our
computational experiments demonstrate that the methods that we propose can
provide substantial improvements over the deterministic linear program. On aver-
age, the total expected revenues obtained by our methods improve those obtained
by the deterministic linear program by 7.11% and there are test problems where
the performance gap can be as high as 17.02%. Similarly, the average gap between
the upper bounds obtained by our methods and the deterministic linear program
is 3.66% and there are test problems where the gap between the upper bounds is
as high as 7.98%. Furthermore, our computational experiments indicate that the
two methods that we propose complement each other as they provide improve-
ments over the deterministic linear program. In particular, one of the methods is
successful in obtaining tight upper bounds on the optimal total expected revenue,
whereas the other method is successful in identifying pricing policies that yield
high total expected revenues.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we formulate the
pricing problem over an airline network as a dynamic program. Then, in Section
3.3, we describe the deterministic linear program, show that it provides an upper
bound on the optimal total expected revenue and demonstrate how it can be used
to construct a pricing policy. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 propose two new methods for
making pricing decisions. In each one of these sections, we focus on one of the
two methods and show that the method in question provides an upper bound on
the optimal total expected revenue and this upper bound is tighter than the one
provided by the deterministic linear program. Furthermore, we demonstrate how
our methods can be used to construct pricing policies. Next, Section 3.6 provides
computational experiments. Finally, in Section 3.7, we conclude.
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3.2 Problem Formulation
We have a set of flight legs that can be used to serve the requests for itineraries
that arrive randomly over time. At each time period, we adjust the prices for the
itineraries, which, in turn, determine the probability of observing a request for an
itinerary. Pricing serves as the only control mechanism and we do not have the
option of rejecting an itinerary request. Whenever there is an itinerary request,
we accept the itinerary request, generate a revenue that reflects the price for the
itinerary and consume the capacities on the relevant flight legs. The objective is to
adjust the prices for the itineraries over time so as to maximize the total expected
revenue.
The problem takes place over the finite planning horizon T = {1, . . . , τ} and
time period τ+1 is the departure time of the flight legs. A time period corresponds
to a small enough interval of time that there is at most one itinerary request at
each time period. This is a standard modeling approach in the network revenue
management literature. The set of flight legs in the airline network is L and the
set of itineraries is J . The total available capacity on flight leg i is ci. If we
serve a request for itinerary j, then we consume aij units of capacity on flight leg
i. For notational brevity, we denote Aj = {aij : i ∈ L} the resources consumed
by itinerary j. The set of possible prices for itinerary j is given by the finite set
{pkj : k ∈ K} and the price that we charge for itinerary j has to take a value in this
set. If we charge the price pkj for itinerary j, then we observe a request for itinerary
j at a time period with probability λkj . For notational brevity, we let r
k
j = λ
k
j p
k
j so
that rkj is the expected revenue that we generate at a time period from itinerary j
when we charge the price pkj for this itinerary. Throughout the paper, we employ
a few assumptions for the price and probability pairs {(pkj , λkj ) : k ∈ K}. First,
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we assume that
∑
j∈J maxk∈K{λkj} ≤ 1 so that irrespective of the prices that we
charge, there is at most one itinerary request at each time period. Second, we
assume that there exists some φ ∈ K such that λφj = 0. In this case, if we do not
have enough capacity to serve a request for itinerary j, then we can simply charge
the price pφj to ensure that we do not observe a request for itinerary j. Third, as
implicitly evident from our notation, we assume that the probability of observing
a request for itinerary j depends only on the price for itinerary j, but not on the
prices for the other itineraries. This assumption is reasonable when the itineraries
do not serve as substitutes of each other. Furthermore, it is relatively simple to
relax this assumption and we point out possible relaxations throughout the paper.
We use xit to denote the remaining capacity on flight leg i at the beginning
of time period t so that xt = {xit : i ∈ L} gives the state of the remaining leg
capacities. We use ut = {ukjt : j ∈ J , k ∈ K} to capture the decisions at time
period t, where ukjt = 1 if we charge the price p
k
j for itinerary j at time period t
and ukjt = 0 otherwise. In this case, the set of feasible decisions at time period t is
given by
U(xt) =
{
ut ∈ {0, 1}|J ||K| :
∑
k∈K
aij λ
k
j u
k
jt ≤ xit ∀ i ∈ L, j ∈ J (3.1)∑
k∈K
ukjt = 1 ∀j ∈ J
}
. (3.2)
Since λφj = 0, constraints (3.1) ensure that if we do not have enough capacity
to serve a request for itinerary j, then we charge the price pφj for this itinerary.
Constraints (3.2) ensure that each itinerary is offered at a single price at each time
period. We use Vt(xt) to denote the maximum total expected revenue that can
be obtained over the time periods {t, . . . , τ} given that the state of the remaining
leg capacities at the beginning of time period t is xt. We can evaluate the value
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functions {Vt(·) : t ∈ T } by solving the optimality equation
Vt(xt) = max
ut∈U(xt)
{∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K
ukjt
{
rkj + λ
k
j Vt+1(xt − Aj)
}
+
[
1−
∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K
ukjt λ
k
j
]
Vt+1(xt)
}
(3.3)
with the boundary condition that Vτ+1(·) = 0. If the state of the remaining leg
capacities at the beginning of time period t is given by xt, then we can find the
optimal pricing decisions by solving the problem on the right side of the optimality
equation in (3.3).
Unfortunately, the optimality equation in (3.3) involves a high dimensional
state variable and the computation of {Vt(·) : t ∈ T } easily gets intractable for
practical problems. In the next section, we begin by formulating a linear program-
ming approximation to the optimality equation in (3.3). This linear program later
serves as a starting point for our solution methods.
3.3 Deterministic Linear Program
Under the assumption that the itinerary requests take on their expected values,
it is possible to formulate a deterministic linear program to approximate the total
expected revenue over the planning horizon. In particular, letting wkj be the num-
ber of time periods at which we charge the price pkj for itinerary j, we can solve
59
the problem
max
∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K
rkj w
k
j (3.4)
subject to
∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K
aij λ
k
j w
k
j ≤ ci ∀ i ∈ L (3.5)
∑
k∈K
wkj = τ ∀ j ∈ J (3.6)
wkj ≥ 0 ∀ j ∈ J , k ∈ K (3.7)
to approximate the total expected revenue. In the problem above, the objec-
tive function accounts for the total expected revenue over the planning horizon.
Constraints (3.5) ensure that our decisions do not violate the leg capacities. Con-
straints (3.6) ensure that the total number of time periods at which we charge the
different prices is equal to the number of time periods in the planning horizon.
There are two uses of problem (3.4)-(3.7). First, the optimal objective value
of problem (3.4)-(3.7) provides an upper bound on the total expected revenue
obtained by the optimal control policy. Such an upper bound becomes useful
when assessing the optimality gap of a suboptimal control policy. In particular, if
we denote c = {ci : i ∈ L} the vector of available capacities on the flight legs, V1(c)
is the optimal total expected revenue over the planning horizon. In this case, if we
let zˆLP be the optimal objective value of problem (3.4)-(3.7), the next proposition
shows that zˆLP provides an upper bound on V1(c). The proofs of all of our results
can be found in the Appendix B.
Proposition 3.3.1 We have V1(c) ≤ zˆLP .
Gallego and van Ryzin (1997) show an analogue of Proposition 3.3.1. The ap-
pealing aspect of their result is that they assume that the prices can take values
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over a continuum and the itinerary requests arrive in continuous time according a
Poisson process. However, their result requires that the expected revenue from an
itinerary is a concave function of the arrival probability, whereas Proposition 3.3.1
does not make an assumption for the relationship between rkj and λ
k
j .
A second use of problem (3.4)-(3.7) occurs when we try to make the pricing
decisions. In particular, if we let {wˆkj : j ∈ J , k ∈ K} be the optimal solution
to problem (3.4)-(3.7), then one alternative for making the pricing decisions is to
charge the price pkj for itinerary j with probability wˆ
k
j /τ at each time period. If we
do not have enough capacity to serve a request for itinerary j, then we naturally
charge the price pφj for itinerary j. We refer to this decision rule as DLP-P, where
DLP stands for deterministic linear program and P stands for primal. Another
alternative for making the pricing decisions is to use the optimal dual solution to
problem (3.4)-(3.7). In particular, if we let {pˆii : i ∈ L} be the optimal values
of the dual variables associated with constraints (3.5) in problem (3.4)-(3.7), then
we can use pˆii to capture the opportunity cost of a seat on flight leg i. This
allows us to approximate the value functions {Vt(·) : t ∈ T } with linear functions
{V˜t(·) : t ∈ T } of the form V˜t(xt) =
∑
i∈L pˆii xit. In this case, we can replace the
value functions {Vt(·) : t ∈ T } on the right side of problem (3.3) with the linear
value function approximations {V˜t(·) : t ∈ T } and solve this problem to make the
pricing decisions at time period t. We refer to this decision rule as DLP-D, where
D stands for dual.
Closing this section, we briefly elaborate on how to extend problem (3.4)-(3.7)
to cover the case where the probability of observing a request for itinerary j does
not depend only on the price for itinerary j, but also on the prices for the other
itineraries. To cover this case, we let {pk : k ∈ K} be the set of possible joint
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prices for the itineraries, where the vector pk = {pkj : j ∈ J } includes the prices
of all itineraries. If we charge the prices pk for the itineraries, then we observe
a request for itinerary j at a time period with probability λkj and λ
k
j can depend
on the whole vector of prices pk. In this case, if we let wk be the number of time
periods at which we charge the prices pk for the itineraries, then all we need to
do is to replace the decision variables {wkj : j ∈ J } in problem (3.4)-(3.7) with a
single decision variable wk. In this case, the objective function of problem (3.4)-
(3.7) becomes
∑
k∈K
∑
j∈J r
k
j w
k, where the term
∑
j∈J r
k
j can be interpreted as
the expected revenue that we generate at a time period from all itineraries when we
charge the prices pk. The first set of constraints become
∑
k∈K
∑
j∈J aij λ
k
j w
k ≤ ci
for all i ∈ L, where the term ∑j∈J aij λkj can be interpreted as the expected
capacity consumption at a time period on flight leg i when we charge the prices
pk. The second set of constraints become
∑
k∈K w
k = τ . We note that the number
of possible joint prices {pk : k ∈ K} can be very large in a practical application,
which implies that the number of decision variables in problem (3.4)-(3.7) can also
be very large. However, the number of constraints in problem (3.4)-(3.7) is always
manageable. Therefore, we can solve problem (3.4)-(3.7) in a tractable fashion by
using column generation.
3.4 Decomposition by Revenue Allocation
A shortcoming of the DLP-P and DLP-D decision rules is that they are based
on the assumption that the itinerary requests take on their expected values. In
this section, we build on problem (3.4)-(3.7) to develop a decision rule that ad-
dresses the stochastic nature of the itinerary requests more accurately. We begin
by augmenting the set of flight legs with a fictitious flight leg ψ so that the set
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of flight legs becomes L ∪ {ψ}. We assume that none of the itineraries use the
fictitious flight leg so that its capacity is irrelevant. In this case, using the decision
variables {wkij : i ∈ L ∪ {ψ}, j ∈ J , k ∈ K} instead of the decision variables
{wkj : j ∈ J , k ∈ K}, we observe that problem (3.4)-(3.7) is equivalent to the
problem
max
∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K
rkj w
k
ψj (3.8)
subject to
∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K
aij λ
k
j w
k
ij ≤ ci ∀ i ∈ L (3.9)
∑
k∈K
wkij = τ ∀ i ∈ L, j ∈ J (3.10)
wkψj − wkij = 0 ∀ i ∈ L, j ∈ J , k ∈ K (3.11)
wkij ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ L, j ∈ J , k ∈ K. (3.12)
To see the equivalence between problems (3.4)-(3.7) and (3.8)-(3.12), we note that
we can use constraints (3.11) to replace all of the decision variables {wkij : i ∈ L}
in problem (3.8)-(3.12) with a single decision variable wkψj. In this case, we can
drop constraints (3.11) from problem (3.8)-(3.12) and problems (3.4)-(3.7) and
(3.8)-(3.12) become equivalent to each other. Therefore, recalling the notation in
Section 3.3, we note that the optimal objective value of problem (3.8)-(3.12) is still
zˆLP .
We let {µˆkij : i ∈ L, j ∈ J , k ∈ K} be the optimal values of the dual
variables associated with constraints (3.11) in problem (3.8)-(3.12). If we dualize
these constraints by associating the multipliers {µˆkij : i ∈ L, j ∈ J , k ∈ K} with
them, then the objective function of problem (3.8)-(3.12) reads
∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K[r
k
j −∑
i∈L µˆ
k
ij]w
k
ψj+
∑
i∈L
∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K µˆ
k
ij w
k
ij. By the constraints in the dual of problem
(3.8)-(3.12) associated with the decision variables {wkψj : j ∈ J , k ∈ K}, we have∑
i∈L µˆ
k
ij = r
k
j for all j ∈ J , k ∈ K. Therefore, the term [rkj −
∑
i∈L µˆ
k
ij] in the last
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expression is equal to zero and the optimal objective value of problem (3.8)-(3.12)
is equal to the optimal objective value of the problem
max
∑
i∈L
∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K
µˆkij w
k
ij (3.13)
subject to (3.9), (3.10), (3.12). (3.14)
The crucial observation here is that the objective function and all of constraints
(3.9), (3.10) and (3.12) in problem (3.13)-(3.14) decompose by the flight legs.
This implies that problem (3.13)-(3.14) decomposes into |L| subproblems and the
subproblem corresponding to flight leg i has the form
max
∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K
µˆkij w
k
ij (3.15)
subject to
∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K
aij λ
k
j w
k
ij ≤ ci (3.16)
∑
k∈K
wkij = τ ∀ j ∈ J (3.17)
wkij ≥ 0 ∀ j ∈ J , k ∈ K. (3.18)
Summing up the discussion in the last two paragraphs, if we let zˆiLP be the optimal
objective value of problem (3.15)-(3.18), then we have zˆLP =
∑
i∈L zˆ
i
LP .
Comparing problem (3.15)-(3.18) with problem (3.4)-(3.7), we observe that
problem (3.15)-(3.18) corresponds to the deterministic linear program for a revenue
management problem that takes place over the single flight leg i. In this single leg
revenue management problem, if we charge the price pkj for itinerary j, then the
expected revenue that we generate at a time period from itinerary j is given by
µˆkij. Therefore, we can visualize µˆ
k
ij as the portion of the expected revenue r
k
j that
is allocated to flight leg i. Since by Proposition 3.3.1, the optimal objective value
of the deterministic linear program provides an upper bound on the optimal total
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expected revenue, zˆiLP provides an upper bound on the optimal total expected
revenue in the single leg revenue management problem that takes place over flight
leg i.
On the other hand, we can compute the optimal total expected revenue in the
single leg revenue management problem that takes place over flight leg i by solving
the optimality equation
vit(xit) = max
ut∈U i(xit)
{∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K
ukjt
{
µˆkij + λ
k
j v
i
t+1(xit − aij)
}
+
[
1−
∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K
ukjt λ
k
j
]
vit+1(xit)
}
(3.19)
with the boundary condition that viτ+1(·) = 0. The optimality equation above is
similar to the one in (3.3), but the state variable only keeps track of the remaining
capacity on flight leg i. The superscript i in the value functions emphasizes that
the optimality equation above computes the optimal total expected revenue for
the single leg revenue management problem that takes place over flight leg i. The
set of feasible decisions U i(xit) is given by
U i(xit) =
{
ut ∈ {0, 1}|J ||K| :
∑
k∈K
aij λ
k
j u
k
jt ≤ xit and
∑
k∈K
ukjt = 1 ∀j ∈ J
}
.
We note that the definition of U i(xit) is similar to that of U(xt) in (3.1)-(3.2), but
U i(xit) only imposes the capacity availability on flight leg i.
The optimal total expected revenue in the single leg revenue management prob-
lem that takes place over flight leg i is given by vi1(ci). Furthermore, by the discus-
sion above, zˆiLP provides an upper bound on the optimal total expected revenue
in this single leg revenue management problem. This implies that vi1(ci) ≤ zˆiLP .
If we add over all i ∈ L and recall that we have ∑i∈L zˆiLP = zˆLP , then we ob-
tain
∑
i∈L v
i
1(ci) ≤ zˆLP . On the other hand, the next proposition shows that
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V1(c) ≤
∑
i∈L v
i
1(ci) and we obtain V1(c) ≤
∑
i∈L v
i
1(ci) ≤ zˆLP . Therefore, we can
solve the optimality equation in (3.19) to obtain an upper bound on the optimal
total expected revenue and this upper bound is tighter than the one provided by
the optimal objective value of problem (3.4)-(3.7). Solving the optimality equa-
tion in (3.19) is tractable since this optimality equation involves a one-dimensional
state variable.
Proposition 3.4.1 We have Vt(xt) ≤
∑
i∈L v
i
t(xit) for all t ∈ T .
In addition to bounding the optimal total expected revenue, we can use the
optimality equation in (3.19) to make the pricing decisions. In particular, we can
approximate the value functions {Vt(·) : t ∈ T } with separable upper bounds
{V˜t(·) : t ∈ T } of the form V˜t(xt) =
∑
i∈L v
i
t(xit). In this case, we can replace the
value functions {Vt(·) : t ∈ T } on the right side of problem (3.3) with the separable
value function approximations {V˜t(·) : t ∈ T } and solve this problem to make the
pricing decisions at time period t. We refer to this decision rule as DRA, standing
for decomposition by revenue allocation. Our choice of terminology is motivated
by the fact that {µˆkij : i ∈ L} serve as the portions of the expected revenue rkj that
are allocated to the different flight legs.
3.5 Decomposition by Leg Relaxation
In this section, we describe a second decision rule that also addresses the stochastic
nature of the itinerary requests. Similar to the DRA decision rule in the previous
section, the starting point for this decision rule is a duality argument on problem
(3.4)-(3.7), but the specifics of the duality argument are different. We let {pˆii : i ∈
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L} be the optimal values of the dual variables associated with constraints (3.5) in
problem (3.4)-(3.7). We pick an arbitrary flight leg i and relax constraints (3.5)
for all other flight legs by associating the dual multipliers {pˆil : l ∈ L \ {i}}. In
this case, by linear programming duality, problem (3.4)-(3.7) has the same optimal
objective value as the problem
max
∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K
[
rkj −
∑
l∈L\{i}
alj λ
k
j pˆil
]
wkj +
∑
l∈L\{i}
pˆil cl (3.20)
subject to
∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K
aij λ
k
j w
k
j ≤ ci (3.21)
(3.6), (3.7). (3.22)
We recall that we use zˆLP to denote this common optimal objective value. Ignor-
ing the constant term
∑
l∈L\{i} pˆil cl in the objective function above and comparing
problem (3.20)-(3.22) with problem (3.4)-(3.7), we observe that problem (3.20)-
(3.22) corresponds to the deterministic linear program for a revenue management
problem that takes place over the single flight leg i. In this single leg revenue
management problem, if we charge the price level k for itinerary j, then the ex-
pected revenue that we generate at a time period from itinerary j is given by
rkj −
∑
l∈L\{i} alj λ
k
j pˆil. Since by Proposition 3.3.1, the optimal objective value of
the deterministic linear program provides an upper bound on the optimal total
expected revenue, zˆLP −
∑
l∈L\{i} pˆil cl provides an upper bound on the optimal
total expected revenue in the single leg revenue management problem that takes
place over flight leg i.
We can use an optimality equation similar to the one in (3.19) to compute the
optimal total expected revenue in the single leg revenue management problem that
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takes place over flight leg i. In particular, this optimality equation is given by
ϑit(xit) = max
ut∈U i(xit)
{∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K
ukjt
{
rkj −
∑
l∈L\{i}
alj λ
k
j pˆil + λ
k
j ϑ
i
t+1(xit − aij)
}
+
[
1−
∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K
ukjt λ
k
j
]
ϑit+1(xit)
}
(3.23)
with the boundary condition that ϑiτ+1(·) = 0. The optimal total expected revenue
in the single leg revenue management problem that takes place over flight leg i is
ϑi1(ci) and by the discussion in the previous paragraph, we have ϑ
i
1(ci) ≤ zˆLP −∑
l∈L\{i} pˆil cl. On the other hand, the next proposition shows that V1(c) ≤ ϑi1(ci)+∑
l∈L\{i} pˆil cl and we obtain V1(c) ≤ ϑi1(ci)+
∑
l∈L\{i} pˆil cl ≤ zˆLP . Therefore, we can
solve the optimality equation in (3.23) to obtain an upper bound on the optimal
total expected revenue and this upper bound is tighter than the one provided by
the optimal objective value of problem (3.4)-(3.7). Furthermore, since the choice of
flight leg i is completely arbitrary, the last chain of inequalities hold for all i ∈ L,
in which case, we can take the minimum over all i ∈ L and use
min
i∈L
{
ϑi1(ci) +
∑
l∈L\{i}
pˆil cl
}
as the tightest possible upper bound on the optimal total expected revenue and
this upper bound is also tighter than the one provided by zˆLP .
Proposition 3.5.1 We have Vt(xt) ≤ ϑit(xit)+
∑
l∈L\{i} pˆil xlt for all i ∈ L, t ∈ T .
Each of {ϑit(xit) +
∑
l∈L\{i} pˆil xlt : i ∈ L} provides an upper bound on Vt(xt),
but it is not clear which one of these upper bounds to use as a value function
approximation when making the pricing decisions. A natural approach is to average
over all i ∈ L and make the pricing decisions by using
V˜t(xt) =
1
|L|
∑
i∈L
{
ϑit(xit) +
∑
l∈L\{i}
pˆil xlt
}
(3.24)
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as an approximation to Vt(xt). Unfortunately, this idea does not perform too much
better than the DLP-D decision rule. To see the reason, we first observe that if
we make the pricing decisions by replacing the value functions {Vt(·) : t ∈ T } in
problem (3.3) by any value function approximations {V˜t(·) : t ∈ T }, then we need
to solve a problem of the form
max
ut∈U(xt)
{∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K
ukjt
{
rkj + λ
k
j V˜t+1(xt − Aj)
}
+
[
1−
∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K
ukjt λ
k
j
]
V˜t+1(xt)
}
= max
ut∈U(xt)
{∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K
ukjt
{
rkj + λ
k
j V˜t+1(xt − Aj)− λkj V˜t+1(xt)
}}
+ V˜t+1(xt).
(3.25)
Focusing on the second problem above, since the last term V˜t+1(xt) is independent
of the pricing decisions at time period t, we observe that the term that really affects
the quality of the pricing decisions is the difference V˜t+1(xt)− V˜t+1(xt − Aj).
We proceed to compare the form of the difference V˜t+1(xt) − V˜t+1(xt − Aj)
for the value function approximations used by the DLP-D decision rule and for
the value function approximations given in (3.24). As described in Section 3.3,
the value function approximations used by the DLP-D decision rule is of the form
V˜t(xt) =
∑
i∈L pˆii xit for all t ∈ T . Therefore, for the value function approximations
used by the DLP-D decision rule, we have V˜t+1(xt)− V˜t+1(xt − Aj) =
∑
i∈L aij pˆii.
On the other hand, for the value function approximations given in (3.24), we have
V˜t+1(xt)− V˜t+1(xt − Aj) = 1|L|
∑
i∈L
{
ϑit+1(xit)− ϑit+1(xit − aij) +
∑
l∈L\{i}
alj pˆil
}
.
(3.26)
We let Lj be the set of flight legs that are used by itinerary j. If i 6∈ Lj, then we
have aij = 0 by definition so that the sum in the curly brackets above can succinctly
be written as
∑
l∈L\{i} alj pˆil =
∑
l∈L alj pˆil whenever i 6∈ Lj. Furthermore, we have
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ϑit+1(xit)− ϑit+1(xit − aij) = 0 for all i 6∈ Lj. In this case, we can write (3.26) as
V˜t+1(xt)− V˜t+1(xt − Aj)
=
1
|L|
{∑
i∈Lj
{
ϑit+1(xit)− ϑit+1(xit − aij) +
∑
l∈L\{i}
alj pˆil
}
+
∑
i∈L\Lj
[∑
l∈L
alj pˆil
]}
.
(3.27)
One way to visualize the expression on the right side above is that each flight
leg contributes one term to the average. A flight leg i ∈ Lj contributes the term
ϑit+1(xit)− ϑit+1(xit − aij) +
∑
l∈L\{i} alj pˆil, whereas a flight leg i 6∈ Lj contributes
the term
∑
l∈L alj pˆil. In general, the number of flight legs in the airline network
that are not used by itinerary j is much larger than the number of flight legs
that are used by itinerary j. This implies that we would expect the average in
(3.27) to be dominated by the terms
∑
l∈L alj pˆil contributed by the flight legs that
are not used by itinerary j, in which case, the average in (3.27) would be very
close to
∑
l∈L alj pˆil. Therefore, for the value function approximations used by the
DLP-D decision rule and for the value function approximations given in (3.24), the
differences V˜t+1(xt) − V˜t+1(xt − Aj) are very similar to each other and using the
value function approximations in (3.24) does not provide too much improvement
over using the DLP-D decision rule.
To deal with this difficulty, instead of taking an average over all flight legs as
in (3.27), we only take an average over the flight legs i ∈ Lj. In particular, we
replace the difference V˜t+1(xt)− V˜t+1(xt − Aj) in problem (3.25) with
1
|Lj|
∑
i∈Lj
{
ϑit+1(xit)− ϑit+1(xit − aij) +
∑
l∈L\{i}
alj pˆil
}
and solve this problem to make the pricing decisions at time period t. We refer to
this decision rule as DLR, standing for decomposition by leg relaxation. Our choice
of terminology is motivated by the fact that the DLR decision rule is obtained by
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relaxing the capacity constraints in problem (3.4)-(3.7).
Both the DRA and DLR decision rules are obtained by building on problem
(3.4)-(3.7). Therefore, it is possible to follow the discussion at the end of Section
3.3 so as to extend the DRA and DLR decision rules to handle the case where the
probability of observing a request for itinerary j does not depend only on the price
for itinerary j, but also on the prices for the other itineraries.
3.6 Computational Experiments
In this section, we numerically compare the upper bounds and total expected
revenues obtained by the decision rules that we describe in Sections 3.3, 3.4 and
3.5.
3.6.1 Experimental Setup and Benchmark Strategies
In our computational experiments, we consider two types of functions that capture
the relationship between the price and the probability of observing an itinerary
request. In the first type of function, we assume that the probability of observing
an itinerary request is a linear function of the price. In particular, we let Λj(p) =
ρj [1− p/κj] so that if we charge the price p for itinerary j, then the probability of
observing a request for itinerary j at a time period is given by Λj(p). The parameter
ρj can be interpreted as the probability of observing a request for itinerary j
when we do not charge anything for this itinerary and the parameter κj can be
interpreted as the price sensitivity. The price for itinerary j ranges over the interval
[0, κj] so that we have Λj(p) ∈ [0, ρj] for all p ∈ [0, κj]. To work with a finite set of
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price and probability pairs {(pkj , λkj ) : k ∈ K}, we discretize the interval [0, ρj] into
40 equal pieces and focus on the probabilities λkj = (k − 1)ρj/40 and the prices
pkj = Λ
−1
j (λ
k
j ) for all k = 1, . . . , 41, where Λ
−1
j (·) denotes the functional inverse of
Λj(·). In the second type of function, we assume that the probability of observing
a request for an itinerary is an exponential function of the price. In particular, we
let Λj(p) = ρj e
−p/κj , where the interpretations for ρj and κj are the same as in
the linear case. We assume that the price for itinerary j ranges over the interval
[0, ln(10)κj] so that we have Λj(p) ∈ [ρj/10, ρj] for all p ∈ [0, ln(10)κj]. Similar to
the linear case, we discretize the interval [ρj/10, ρj] into 40 equal pieces and focus
on the probabilities λkj = [ρj/10] + (k − 1) 9 ρj/400 and the prices pkj = Λ−1j (λkj )
for all k = 1, . . . , 41. In addition to these 41 price and probability pairs, to obtain
some φ ∈ K such that λφj = 0, we assume that ∞ is an admissible price and if we
charge this price, then the probability of observing an itinerary request is zero.
Figure 3.1: Airline network with eight spokes.
Our test problems are based on those in Kunnumkal and Topaloglu (2009b).
We consider an airline network that serves N spokes from a single hub. There
is one flight leg from each spoke to the hub and another flight leg from the hub
to each spoke. Figure 3.1 shows the airline network with N = 8. There are two
itineraries associated with every possible origin destination pair. One of these
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itineraries is highly price sensitive and the other one is moderately price sensitive.
Therefore, there are 2N flight legs and 2N(N +1) itineraries, 4N of which include
one flight leg and 2N(N − 1) of which include two flight legs. The price sensitivity
associated with a highly price sensitive itinerary is κ times larger than the price
sensitivity associated with the corresponding moderately price sensitive itinerary.
To measure the tightness of the leg capacities, we let kˆj = argmaxk∈K{rkj } so that
the price and probability pair (pkˆ
j
j , λ
kˆj
j ) maximizes the one period expected revenue
from itinerary j. If we charge the prices {pkˆjj : j ∈ J } for the itineraries, then
the total expected demand for the capacity on flight leg i is τ
∑
j∈J aij λ
kˆj
j where
τ is the number of time periods in the planning horizon. Then, we measure the
tightness of the leg capacities by
γ =
τ
∑
i∈L
∑
j∈J aij λ
kˆj
j∑
i∈L ci
.
We use (T,N, γ, κ) to label our test problems, where T ∈ {L,E} denotes whether
{Λj(·) : j ∈ J } are linear or exponential functions and the remaining three
components are as described above. We vary (T,N, γ, κ) over {L,E} × {4, 8} ×
{1.2, 1.6, 2.0} × {2, 4, 8} and this provides 36 test problems.
We use three benchmark strategies. Our first benchmark strategy corresponds
to the DLP-P decision rule that we describe at the end of Section 3.3. Our practical
implementation of this decision rule divides the planning horizon into S equal
segments and resolves problem (3.4)-(3.7) at time periods {1 + (s − 1)τ/S : s =
1, . . . , S}. In particular, at the beginning of segment s, we replace the right side of
constraints (3.5) with the current remaining leg capacities {xi,1+(s−1)τ/S : i ∈ L}
and the right side of constraints (3.6) with the current remaining number of time
periods τ − (s− 1)τ/S. We solve problem (3.4)-(3.7) and letting {wˆkj : j ∈ J , k ∈
K} be an optimal solution to this problem, we charge the price pkj for itinerary
j with probability wˆkj /[τ − (s − 1)τ/S] until we reach the beginning of the next
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segment. A few setup runs indicated that increasing S beyond 12 does not improve
the performance of the DLP-P decision rule noticeably so that we use S = 12.
The performances of the DLP-P and DLP-D decision rules turn out to be virtually
identical in all of our test problems and we do not provide detailed results for
the DLP-D decision rule. Our second benchmark strategy corresponds to the
DRA decision rule that we describe at the end of Section 3.4, whereas our third
benchmark strategy corresponds to the DLR decision rule that we describe at
the end of Section 3.5. For the DRA and DLR decision rules, it is also possible
to divide the planning horizon into equal segments and resolve problems (3.8)-
(3.12) and (3.4)-(3.7) at the beginning of each segment to obtain new values for
{µˆkij : i ∈ L, j ∈ J , k ∈ K} and {pˆii : i ∈ L}, but it turns out that this extension
does not provide any noticeable improvement for these decision rules.
3.6.2 Computational Results
Our main computational results are summarized in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. In partic-
ular, Table 3.1 and 3.2 respectively show the results for the test problems where
{Λj(·) : j ∈ J } are linear and exponential functions. The first column in these
tables shows the problem characteristics. The second, third and fourth columns
respectively show the upper bounds on the optimal total expected revenue ob-
tained by DLP-P, DRA and DLR. The fifth and sixth columns show the percent
gaps between the upper bounds obtained by DRA and the remaining two bench-
mark strategies. The upper bounds obtained by DRA are consistently the tightest
and we use DRA as a reference when comparing the upper bounds. The seventh,
eighth and ninth columns respectively show the total expected revenues obtained
by DLP-P, DRA and DLR.
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We estimate these total expected revenues by simulating the performances of the
different benchmark strategies under multiple sample paths. We use common
random numbers when simulating the performances of the different benchmark
strategies and all of the performance gaps are statistically significant at 95% level.
The tenth and eleventh columns show the percent gaps between the total expected
revenues obtained by DLR and the remaining two benchmark strategies. The total
expected revenues obtained DLR are consistently the highest and we use DLR as a
reference when comparing the total expected revenues. The twelfth column reports
the percent gap between the most successful strategy, DLR, and the tightest bound
obtained by DRA.
Comparing the upper bounds obtained by the three benchmark strategies, we
observe that the upper bounds obtained by DRA are significantly tighter than those
obtained by DLP-P and DLR. For the test problems in Table 3.1, the average gap
between the upper bounds obtained by DRA and DLP-P is 3.28%, whereas the
average gap between the upper bounds obtained by DRA and DLR is 2.04%. When
we move to the test problems in Table 3.2, the upper bounds obtained by DRA
improve those obtained by DLP-P and DLR by respectively 3.94% and 2.57%
on average. There are test problems where the gap between the upper bounds
obtained by DRA and DLP-P is as high as 7.98% and the gap between the upper
bounds obtained by DRA and DLR is as high as 6.11%. In all of our test problems,
the upper bounds obtained by DRA are uniformly tighter than those obtained by
DLP-P and DLR.
Comparing the total expected revenues obtained by the three benchmark strate-
gies, we observe that DLR obtains significantly higher total expected revenues than
DLP-P and DRA. For the test problems in Table 3.1, the average gap between the
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total expected revenues obtained by DLR and DLP-P is 5.05%, whereas the aver-
age gap between the total expected revenues obtained by DLP and DRA is 2.94%.
When we move to the test problems in Table 3.2, the total expected revenues ob-
tained by DLR improve those obtained by DLP-P and DRA by respectively 9.17%
and 3.41% on average. There are test problems where the gap between the total
expected revenues obtained by DLR and DLP-P is as high as 17.02% and the gap
between the total expected revenues obtained by DLR and DRA is as high as
5.53%. In all of our test problems, the total expected revenues obtained by DLR
are uniformly higher than those obtained by DLP-P and DRA. Although the total
expected revenues obtained by DRA are not as high as those obtained by DLR,
DRA also provides significant improvements over DLP-P.
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Figure 3.2: Percent gaps between the upper bounds obtained by DRA and
the remaining two benchmark strategies for the test problems
where {Λj(·) : j ∈ J } are exponential functions.
DLP-P represents one of the traditional approaches for solving pricing problems
and our results indicate that DRA and DLR complement each other as they provide
improvements over DLP-P. In particular, DRA tightens the upper bounds and
allows us to assess the optimality gaps more accurately, whereas DLR obtains
higher total expected revenues. To give a feel for the problem parameters that
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affect the relative performances of the three benchmark strategies, Figure 3.2 plots
the gaps between the upper bounds obtained by DRA and the remaining two
benchmark strategies and Figure 3.3 plots the gaps between the total expected
revenues obtained by DLR and the remaining two benchmark strategies. The test
problems in the horizontal axis in these figures are arranged in such a fashion that
the first and last nine test problems respectively involve four and eight spokes.
The leg capacities get tighter as we move from left to right within a block of
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Figure 3.3: Percent gaps between the total expected revenues obtained by
DLR and the remaining two benchmark strategies for the test
problems where {Λj(·) : j ∈ J } are exponential functions.
nine test problems. The difference between the price sensitivities of the highly and
moderately price sensitive itineraries gets larger as we move from left to right within
a block of three test problems. For economy of space, Figures 3.2 and 3.3 consider
only the case where {Λj(·) : j ∈ J } are exponential functions. Figure 3.2 indicates
that the gaps between the upper bounds obtained by DRA and the remaining two
benchmark strategies get larger as the leg capacities get tighter, whereas Figure
3.3 indicates that the gaps between the total expected revenues obtained by DLR
and the remaining two benchmark strategies get larger as the difference in the
price sensitivities gets larger. If we had infinite capacity on the flight legs, then
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the different time periods in the planning horizon would not interact. In this case,
letting kˆj = argmaxk∈K{rkj }, it would be trivially optimal to charge the prices
{pkˆjj : j ∈ J } for the itineraries. Therefore, we intuitively expect the test problems
with tight leg capacities to be more difficult. On the other hand, if the difference in
the price sensitivities of the highly and moderately price sensitive itineraries gets
larger, then we use a richer set of prices to obtain good performance. Therefore,
we also intuitively expect the test problems with larger differences in the price
sensitivities to be more difficult. These observations indicate that DRA obtains
especially tighter upper bounds and DLR obtains especially higher total expected
revenues for the test problems that we intuitively expect to be more difficult.
Table 3.3: CPU seconds for DRA and DLR.
No. Time CPU Seconds
Pers. (τ) DRA DLR
180 3.43 0.44
360 4.17 1.34
720 7.67 5.02
1,440 22.16 19.52
No. CPU Seconds
Spokes (N) DRA DLR
4 0.68 0.58
6 1.81 1.06
8 4.17 1.34
10 9.05 1.74
Table 3.3 shows the CPU seconds for DRA and DLR with different numbers
of time periods in the planning horizon and with different numbers of spokes in
the airline network. All of our computational experiments are carried out on a
Pentium IV PC runningWindows XP with 2.4 Ghz CPU and 1 GB RAM. The CPU
seconds for DRA correspond to the time required to solve problem (3.8)-(3.12) and
the optimality equation in (3.19), whereas the CPU seconds for DLR correspond
to the time required to solve problem (3.4)-(3.7) and the optimality equation in
(3.23). The results indicate that the CPU seconds for DRA are noticeably longer
than those for DLR. This discrepancy is due to the fact that DRA is based on
problem (3.8)-(3.12) and this problem is significantly larger than problem (3.4)-
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(3.7), which forms the starting point for DLR. Even for the largest test problems,
the CPU seconds for both DRA and DLR are quite reasonable. The CPU seconds
for DLP-P are on the order of a fraction of a second and we do not provide detailed
CPU seconds for DLP-P. Overall, considering their improvements over DLP-P in
terms of both upper bounds and total expected revenues, we conclude that DRA
and DLR are strong candidates for solving practical pricing problems.
3.7 Conclusions
In this paper, we developed two methods for making pricing decisions in network
revenue management problems. Both methods decompose the dynamic program-
ming formulation of the problem by the flight legs and solve dynamic programs
with one-dimensional state variables. We established that our methods obtain
upper bounds on the optimal total expected revenue and these upper bounds are
tighter than the one obtained by the deterministic linear program. Our computa-
tional experiments demonstrated significant improvements over the deterministic
linear program and indicated that the two methods complement each other. In
particular, the first method is useful in obtaining tight bounds on the optimal to-
tal expected revenue, whereas the pricing policy from the second method obtains
higher total expected revenues.
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APPENDIX
B Omitted proofs from Chapter 3
B.1 Proof of Proposition 3.3.1
We let {Uˆkjt : j ∈ J , k ∈ K, t ∈ T } be the pricing decisions under the optimal
control policy, where Uˆkjt = 1 if we charge the price p
k
j for itinerary j at time period
t and Uˆkjt = 0 otherwise. Similarly, we let Sˆjt = 1 if we serve a request for itinerary
j at time period t under the optimal control policy and Sˆjt = 0 otherwise. We note
that {Uˆkjt : j ∈ J , k ∈ K, t ∈ T } and {Sˆjt : j ∈ J , t ∈ T } are random variables
and we have
∑
k∈K Uˆ
k
jt = 1 for all j ∈ J , t ∈ T by the feasibility of the pricing
decisions. Furthermore, using Uˆjt to denote the vector {Uˆkjt : k ∈ K}, we have
E{Sˆjt} = E{E{Sˆjt | Uˆjt}} =
∑
k∈K E{Sˆjt | Uˆkjt = 1}P{Uˆkjt = 1} =
∑
k∈K λ
k
j E{Uˆkjt},
where the last equality follows from the fact that E{Sˆjt | Uˆkjt = 1} = λkj and P{Uˆkjt =
1} = E{Uˆkjt} since Uˆkjt is a Bernoulli random variable. Under the optimal control
policy, the price that we charge for itinerary j at time period t is
∑
k∈K p
k
j Uˆ
k
jt.
Thus, letting Πˆ be the optimal total expected revenue, we have
Πˆ = E
{∑
t∈T
∑
j∈J
Sˆjt
[∑
k∈K
pkj Uˆ
k
jt
]}
=
∑
t∈T
∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K
pkj E{Sˆjt Uˆkjt}
=
∑
t∈T
∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K
pkj E{Sˆjt | Uˆkjt = 1}P{Uˆkjt = 1} =
∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K
pkj λ
k
j
[∑
t∈T
E{Uˆkjt}
]
. (B.1)
On the other hand, since the itinerary requests that we serve satisfy the capacity
constraints, we have
∑
t∈T
∑
j∈J aij Sˆjt ≤ ci for all i ∈ L. Taking expectations in
the last inequality and noting that E{Sˆjt} =
∑
k∈K λ
k
j E{Uˆkjt}, we obtain∑
t∈T
∑
j∈J
aij E{Sˆjt} =
∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K
aij λ
k
j
[∑
t∈T
E{Uˆkjt}
]
≤ ci. (B.2)
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By the feasibility of the pricing decisions, we have
∑
k∈K Uˆ
k
jt = 1 for all j ∈ J ,
t ∈ T . If we take expectations and add over all time periods, then we obtain∑
k∈K
[∑
t∈T
E{Uˆkjt}
]
= τ. (B.3)
By (B.2) and (B.3), {∑t∈T E{Uˆkjt} : j ∈ J , k ∈ K} is a feasible solution to problem
(3.4)-(3.7). Furthermore, the objective value provided by this feasible solution is∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K r
k
j [
∑
t∈T E{Uˆkjt}] = Πˆ, where the equality follows by (B.1). Thus, the
optimal objective value of problem (3.4)-(3.7) is at least Πˆ. 2
B.2 Proof of Proposition 3.4.1
We show the result by induction over the time periods. For time period τ + 1, we
have Vτ+1(·) = 0 and viτ+1(·) = 0 for all i ∈ L so that the result holds trivially for
time period τ +1. Assuming that the result holds for time period t+1 and letting
uˆt be the optimal solution to problem (3.3), we have
Vt(xt) =
∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K
uˆkjt
{
rkj + λ
k
j Vt+1(xt − Aj)
}
+
[
1−
∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K
uˆkjt λ
k
j
]
Vt+1(xt)
≤
∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K
uˆkjt
{
rkj + λ
k
j
∑
i∈L
vit+1(xit − aij)
}
+
[
1−
∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K
uˆkjt λ
k
j
] ∑
i∈L
vit+1(xit)
=
∑
i∈L
{∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K
uˆkjt
{
µˆkij + λ
k
j v
i
t+1(xit − aij)
}
+
[
1−
∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K
uˆkjt λ
k
j
]
vit+1(xit)
}
≤
∑
i∈L
vit(xit),
where the first inequality follows from the induction assumption, the second equal-
ity follows from the fact that rkj =
∑
i∈L µˆ
k
ij for all j ∈ J , k ∈ K and the last
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inequality follows from the fact that uˆt is a feasible but not necessarily an optimal
solution to problem (3.19). 2
B.3 Proof of Proposition 3.5.1
We use an induction argument that is similar to the proof of Proposition 3.4.1.
For time period τ + 1, we have Vτ+1(·) = 0, ϑiτ+1(·) = 0 for all i ∈ L and pˆil ≥ 0
for all l ∈ L by dual feasibility to problem (3.4)-(3.7). Therefore, the result holds
for time period τ + 1. Assuming that the result holds for time period t + 1 and
letting uˆt be the optimal solution to problem (3.3), we have
Vt(xt) =
∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K
uˆkjt
{
rkj + λ
k
j Vt+1(xt − Aj)
}
+
[
1−
∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K
uˆkjt λ
k
j
]
Vt+1(xt)
≤
∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K
uˆkjt
{
rkj + λ
k
j ϑ
i
t+1(xit − aij) + λkj
∑
l∈L\{i}
pˆil [xlt − alj]
}
+
[
1−
∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K
uˆkjt λ
k
j
] [
ϑit+1(xit) +
∑
l∈L\{i}
pˆil xlt
]
=
∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K
uˆkjt
{
rkj −
∑
l∈L\{i}
alj λ
k
j pˆil + λ
k
j ϑ
i
t+1(xit − aij)
}
+
[
1−
∑
j∈J
∑
k∈K
uˆkjt λ
k
j
]
ϑit+1(xit) +
∑
l∈L\{i}
pˆil xlt
≤
∑
i∈L
ϑit(xit) +
∑
l∈L\{i}
pˆil xlt,
where the first inequality follows from the induction assumption and the last in-
equality follows from the fact that uˆt is a feasible but not necessarily an optimal
solution to problem (3.23). 2
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Chapter 4
A Dynamic Programming
Decomposition Method for Capacity
Allocation Problems
4.1 Introduction
The problem of allocating limited capacity among competing jobs in a dynamic
fashion occurs in many settings. Clinics allocate appointment slots to patients
with different needs, production plants allocate production capacity to orders with
different priorities, hotels allocate room inventory to customers with different will-
ingness to pay amounts. Controlling such systems requires careful planning for
several reasons. To begin with, the decisions for the current day are made with
limited information about the future job arrivals. The problem is dynamic in the
sense that the future capacity that is not committed to the jobs that arrive today
can be committed to the jobs that arrive tomorrow. Finally, it is crucial to keep a
balance between committing the capacity to a lower priority job that is available
today and reserving the capacity for a potential higher priority job that may arrive
tomorrow.
In this paper, we consider a capacity allocation problem that captures the
tradeoffs described above. We have a fixed amount of daily processing capacity.
Jobs of different priorities arrive randomly over time and we need to decide which
jobs should be scheduled on which days. The jobs that are waiting to be processed
incur holding costs depending on their priority levels. The goal is to minimize the
total expected cost over a planning horizon. It is possible to formulate this problem
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as a dynamic program, but this formulation quickly gets intractable for practical
problem instances. To overcome this difficulty, we decompose the dynamic pro-
gramming formulation of the capacity allocation problem by booking days. As a
result, we obtain tractable approximations to the value functions which can be
used to make capacity allocation decisions over time.
Our approach starts with a dynamic programming formulation of the capacity
allocation problem. To obtain a lower bound on the total expected costs of the op-
timal policy, we formulate a deterministic linear problem based on the assumption
that job arrivals take on their expected values and it is possible to schedule frac-
tional portions of jobs for different days. Using a duality argument, we reformulate
this linear problem so that it can be interpreted as a linear program corresponding
to a capacity allocation problem where the daily capacity is restricted only for one
day in the planning horizon. We refer to this problem as a single-day capacity
allocation problem. Concentrating on the dynamic programming formulation of
this single-day problem, we show that it gives rise to tractable approximations to
the value functions corresponding to the original capacity allocation problem. We
use these value functions approximations to propose a capacity allocation policy.
Furthermore, we show that these value functions approximations provide lower
bounds on the total expected costs of the optimal policy and that these bounds
are tighter than the lower bound provided by the deterministic linear program
discussed above.
Several papers study variations of our capacity allocation problem. The most
related one is Patrick, Puterman and Queyranne (2008), where the authors consider
the allocation of appointment slots in a clinic. The authors begin by formulating
their capacity allocation problem as a dynamic program. Since this formulation
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quickly gets intractable for practical problem instances, they develop an approxi-
mate dynamic programming method that uses linear approximations to the value
functions. To choose the slope parameters of the linear approximations, they
substitute the linear approximations into a linear program that characterizes the
dynamic programming formulation of the capacity allocation problem. A second
paper that is related to our work is Erdelyi and Topaloglu (2009a). Considering
the same capacity allocation problem as here, the authors focus on a class of poli-
cies that are characterized by a set of protection levels and develop a stochastic
approximation method to find a good set of protection levels. Protection level
policies are also considered in Gerchak, Gupta and Henig (1996). The authors
concentrate on the capacity allocation problem with two priority levels. The main
contribution of their paper is to characterize the structure of the optimal policy
and to show that protection level policies are not necessarily optimal.
We borrow the dynamic problem decomposition idea from the revenue man-
agement literature. Williamson (1992) is one of the first to decompose the network
revenue management problem by flight legs. A discussion of early decomposition
heuristics methods is given in Talluri and van Ryzin (2004). Liu and van Ryzin
(2008) and Kunnumkal and Topaloglu (2009a) extend decomposition heuristics
ideas to the network revenue management problem that incorporates customer
choice behavior. Zhang and Adelman (2009) are the first to show that a dynamic
programming decomposition is capable of providing upper bounds on the optimal
total expected revenue in the network revenue management problem. Topaloglu
(2009) demonstrates that decomposition methods can be visualized as an appli-
cation of Lagrangian relaxation to the dynamic programming formulation of the
network revenue management problem. Erdelyi and Topaloglu (2009b) and Erde-
lyi, Kunnumkal and Topaloglu (2009) extend the decomposition ideas to network
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revenue management problems involving overbooking and pricing decisions, re-
spectively. It is interesting to note that the capacity allocation problem that we
consider in this paper can be viewed as a revenue management problem as it
involves making the most use out of limited and perishable capacity. However,
traditional revenue management problems involve only the decision of whether to
accept or reject a job, whereas our capacity allocation problem involves the deci-
sion of when to schedule a job along with whether the job should be accepted or
rejected.
We make the following research contributions in this paper. 1) We develop a
method to make dynamic scheduling decisions in a capacity allocation model in-
volving jobs of different priorities. The idea behind our model is to decompose the
problem by booking days and solve a sequence of single-day capacity allocation
problems. 2) We show that our approach provides a lower bound on the total
expected cost obtained by the optimal policy and this bound is tighter than the
one provided by the deterministic linear program formulation. 3) Computational
experiments demonstrate that our method performs significantly better than stan-
dard benchmark stategies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we describe the
capacity allocation problem and give a precise formulation of the corresponding
dynamic program. Then, Section 4.3 formulates a deterministic linear program
that both gives rise to potential control policies as well as provides a lower bound on
the optimal total expected cost. Section 4.4 decomposes the dynamic program into
a sequence of single-day capacity allocation problems while Section 4.5 addresses
practical issues with solving these single-day allocation problems. In Section 4.6,
we further specify the implementation of the policy suggested by the decomposition
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approach. Next, Section 4.7 presents computational experiments. Finally, Section
4.8 gives concluding remarks.
4.2 Problem Formulation
We have a fixed amount of daily processing capacity. At the beginning of each day,
we observe the arrivals of jobs of different priorities and we need to decide which
jobs should be scheduled for which days. The jobs that are waiting to be processed
incur a holding cost depending on their priority levels and we also have the option
of rejecting a job by incurring a penalty cost. We are interested in minimizing the
total expected cost over a finite planning horizon.
The problem takes place over the set of days T = {1, . . . , τ}. The set of possible
priority levels for the jobs is P = {1, . . . , P} where priority 1 is the highest priority
and priority P is the lowest priority. The number of priority p jobs that arrive
on day t is given by the random variable ωpt so that ωt = {ωpt : p ∈ P} captures
the job arrivals on day t. We assume that the job arrivals on different days are
independent. If we schedule a priority p job that arrives on day t for day j, then
we incur a holding cost of hpjt. The penalty cost of rejecting a priority p job that
arrives on day t is dpt . We let h
p
jt =∞ whenever it is infeasible to schedule a priority
p job arriving on day t for day j. For example, since it is infeasible to schedule
a job for a day in the past, we have hpjt = ∞ whenever j < t. Furthermore, we
assume that all jobs can be scheduled only within a booking horizon of length S
days. In other words, a job arriving on day t can only be scheduled for a day j ∈ St
where St = {t, . . . , t+ S − 1}. Consequently, we let hpjt =∞ whenever j ≥ t+ S.
Once we schedule a job for a particular day, this decision is fixed and cannot be
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changed. We assume that all jobs consume one unit of processing capacity, but
this assumption is only for notational brevity and it is straightforward to extend
our approach to multiple units of capacity consumption.
Given that we are on day t, we let xjt be the remaining capacity on day j so
that xt = {xjt : j ∈ T } captures the state of the remaining capacities observed at
the beginning of day t. We let upjt be the number of priority p jobs that we schedule
for day j on day t so that ut = {upjt : p ∈ P , j ∈ T } captures the decisions that
we make on day t. In this case, the set of feasible decisions on day t is given by
U(xt, ωt) =
{
ut ∈ Z|P||T |+ :
∑
p∈P
upjt ≤ xjt ∀ j ∈ T ,
∑
j∈T
upjt ≤ ωpt ∀ p ∈ P
}
,
(4.1)
where the first set of constraints ensure that the decisions that we make comply
with the remaining capacities and the second set of constraints ensure that the
decisions that we make comply with the job arrivals. On the other hand, the total
cost that we incur on day t is given by
∑
j∈T
∑
p∈P
hpjt u
p
jt +
∑
p∈P
dpt
[
ωpt −
∑
j∈T
upjt
]
,
where the first term corresponds to the holding cost for the jobs that are scheduled
for different days in the planning horizon and the second term corresponds to the
penalty cost for the jobs that are rejected. We note that without loss of generality,
it is possible to assume that dpt = 0 for all p ∈ P , t ∈ T . To see this, we
write the cost function above as
∑
j∈T
∑
p∈P
[
hpjt − dpt
]
upjt +
∑
p∈P d
p
t ω
p
t . Since∑
j∈T
∑
p∈P d
p
t ω
p
t is a constant that is independent of the decisions, assuming that
dpt = 0 for all p ∈ P , t ∈ T is equivalent to letting cpjt = hpjt − dpt and working with
the holding cost cpjt instead of h
p
jt. Throughout the rest of the paper, we indeed
assume that dpt = 0 for all p ∈ P , t ∈ T .
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We use Vt(xt) to denote the minimum possible total expected cost over days
{t, . . . , τ} given that the state of the remaining capacities on day t is xt. Letting
ej be the |T | dimensional unit vector with a one in the element corresponding
to j ∈ T , we can compute the value functions {Vt(·) : t ∈ T } by solving the
optimality equation
Vt(xt) = E
{
min
ut∈U(xt,ωt)
{∑
j∈T
∑
p∈P
cpjt u
p
jt + Vt+1(xt −
∑
j∈T
∑
p∈P
upjt ej)
}}
(4.2)
with the boundary condition that Vτ+1(·) = 0. The optimal total expected cost
over the whole planning horizon is V1(x1), where x1 gives the initial state of the
remaining capacities and it is a part of the problem data. The knowledge of {Vt(·) :
t ∈ T } can be used to find the optimal decisions on each day. In particular, if the
state of the remaining capacities and the job arrivals on day t are respectively given
by xt and ωt, then we can solve the optimization problem inside the expectation
in (4.2) to find the optimal decisions on this day.
Unfortunately, the number of dimensions of the state vector xt is equal to
the number of days, which can easily be on the order of hundreds for practical
applications. Furthermore, solving the optimality equation in (4.2) requires taking
an expectation over the job arrivals on each day and this expectation can be
difficult to compute. These considerations render finding the exact solution to the
optimality equation in (4.2) intractable. In the next two sections, we give two
possible approaches for finding approximate solutions to the optimality equation
in (4.2). The first approach involves solving a linear program, whereas the second
approach builds on this linear program to construct separable approximations to
the value functions.
91
4.3 Linear Programming Formulation
One approach for finding approximate solutions to the optimality equation in (4.2)
involves solving a linear program that is formulated under the assumption that
the job arrivals take their expected values and it is possible to schedule fractional
numbers of jobs for different days. In particular, using the decision variables
{upjt : p ∈ P , j ∈ T , t ∈ T } with the same interpretation as in the previous
section, we can solve the problem
min
∑
t∈T
∑
j∈T
∑
p∈P
cpjt u
p
jt (4.3)
subject to
∑
t∈T
∑
p∈P
upjt ≤ xj1 j ∈ T (4.4)
∑
j∈T
upjt ≤ E{ωpt } p ∈ P , t ∈ T (4.5)
upjt ≥ 0 p ∈ P , j ∈ T , t ∈ T (4.6)
to approximate the optimal total expected cost over the planning horizon. Con-
straints (4.4) in the problem above ensure that the decisions that we make over
the planning horizon do not violate the remaining capacity on each day, whereas
constraints (4.5) ensure that the decisions that we make on each day do not violate
the expected numbers of job arrivals.
One important use of problem (4.3)-(4.6) occurs when we want to obtain lower
bounds on the optimal total expected cost. In particular, if we denote z∗LP the
optimal objective value of problem (4.3)-(4.6), the next proposition shows that
we have z∗LP ≤ V1(x1) so that the optimal objective value of problem (4.3)-(4.6)
provides a lower bound on the optimal total expected cost. Such lower bounds are
useful to get a feel for the optimality gap of any suboptimal control policy.
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Proposition 4.3.1 We have z∗LP ≤ V1(x1).
Proof Our proof is standard, but it allows us to demonstrate a useful inequality.
Given that the job arrivals over the planning horizon are ω = {ωpt : p ∈ P , t ∈ T },
we let pi∗(ω) be the total cost incurred by the optimal policy and z∗LP (ω) be the
optimal objective value of problem (4.3)-(4.6) that is obtained after replacing the
right side of constraints (4.5) with {ωpt : p ∈ P , t ∈ T }. Replacing the right side
of constraints (4.5) with {ωpt : p ∈ P , t ∈ T } and solving problem (4.3)-(4.6)
corresponds to making the decisions after observing first all of the job arrivals over
the whole planning horizon. Furthermore, problem (4.3)-(4.6) allows scheduling
fractional numbers of jobs. On the other hand, the optimal policy makes the
decisions for a particular day after observing the job arrivals only on that day.
Furthermore, the optimal policy schedules integer numbers of jobs. Therefore,
it holds that z∗LP (ω) ≤ pi∗(ω). Taking expectations and noting that z∗LP (ω) is a
convex function of ω, Jensen’s inequality implies that
z∗LP (E{ω}) ≤ E{z∗LP (ω)} ≤ E{pi∗(ω)}. (4.7)
The first expression in the chain of inequalities above is equal to z∗LP , whereas the
last expression is equal to the total expected cost incurred by the optimal policy,
which is given by V1(x1). 2
Therefore, (4.7) implies that both z∗LP and E{z∗LP (ω)} provide lower bounds
on the optimal total expected cost. The lower bound provided by z∗LP is looser,
but this lower bound can be computed simply by solving problem (4.3)-(4.6). On
the other hand, the lower bound provided by E{z∗LP (ω)} is tighter, but there is
no closed form expression for the expectation in E{z∗LP (ω)} and computing this
expectation requires estimation through Monte Carlo samples. Nevertheless, our
computation experiments indicate that this extra computation burden usually pays
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off and the lower bound provided by E{z∗LP (ω)} can be significantly tighter than
the lower bound provided by z∗LP .
Another important use of problem (4.3)-(4.6) occurs when we want to construct
an approximate policy to make the decisions on each day. In particular, letting
{µ∗j : j ∈ T } be the optimal values of the dual variables associated with constraints
(4.4), we can use µ∗j to estimate the value of a unit of remaining capacity on day j.
This idea suggests using
∑
j∈T µ
∗
j xjt as an approximation to Vt(xt). In this case, if
the state of the remaining capacities and the job arrivals on day t are respectively
given by xt and ωt, then we can replace Vt+1(xt −
∑
j∈T
∑
p∈P u
p
jt ej) on the right
side of (4.2) with
∑
j∈T µ
∗
j
[
xjt −
∑
p∈P u
p
jt
]
and solve the problem
min
ut∈U(xt,ωt)
{∑
j∈T
∑
p∈P
cpjt u
p
jt +
∑
j∈T
µ∗j
[
xjt −
∑
p∈P
upjt
]}
(4.8)
to make the decisions on day t. We use this approach as a benchmark strategy
later in the paper.
In the next section, we show how we can use problem (4.3)-(4.6) to construct
separable approximations to the value functions.
4.4 Dynamic Programming Decomposition
The method that we develop in this section constructs separable approximations to
the value functions by decomposing the optimality equation in (4.2) into a sequence
of optimality equations, each involving a scalar state variable. We begin with a
duality argument on problem (4.3)-(4.6). We let {µ∗j : j ∈ T } be the optimal values
of the dual variables associated with constraints (4.4) in problem (4.3)-(4.6). We
choose an arbitrary day i in the planning horizon and relax constraints (4.4) for
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all of the other days by associating the dual multipliers {µ∗j : j ∈ T \ {i}} with
them. In this case, if we let 1(·) be the indicator function, the objective function
of problem (4.3)-(4.6) can be written as∑
t∈T
∑
j∈T
∑
p∈P
cpjt u
p
jt +
∑
j∈T \{i}
µ∗j
[
xj1 −
∑
t∈T
∑
p∈P
upjt
]
=
∑
t∈T
∑
j∈T
∑
p∈P
[
cpjt − 1(j 6= i)µ∗j
]
upjt +
∑
j∈T \{i}
µ∗j xj1.
Therefore, by linear programming duality, the optimal objective value of problem
(4.3)-(4.6) is the same as the optimal objective value of the problem
min
∑
t∈T
∑
j∈T
∑
p∈P
[
cpjt − 1(j 6= i)µ∗j
]
upjt +
∑
j∈T \{i}
µ∗j xj1 (4.9)
subject to
∑
t∈T
∑
p∈P
upit ≤ xi1 (4.10)
∑
j∈T
upjt ≤ E{ωpt } p ∈ P , t ∈ T (4.11)
upjt ≥ 0 p ∈ P , j ∈ T , t ∈ T . (4.12)
Comparing problem (4.9)-(4.12) with problem (4.3)-(4.6) and ignoring the constant
term
∑
j∈T \{i} µ
∗
j xj1 in the objective function, we observe that problem (4.9)-
(4.12) is the linear programming formulation for a capacity allocation problem
where there is limited capacity only on day i and the capacities on all of the other
days are infinite. In this capacity allocation problem, if we schedule a priority p
job that arrives on day t for day j, then we incur a holding cost of cpjt − 1(j 6=
i)µ∗j . We refer to this problem as the capacity allocation problem focused on
day i. Then, the discussion in this paragraph and Proposition 4.3.1 imply that
z∗LP −
∑
j∈T \{i} µ
∗
j xj1 provides a lower bound on the optimal total expected cost
for the capacity allocation problem focused on day i.
On the other hand, if there is limited capacity only on day i and the capacities
on all of the other days are infinite, then the set of feasible decisions can be written
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as
Ui(xit, ωt) =
{
ut ∈ Z|P||T |+ :
∑
p∈P
upit ≤ xit,
∑
j∈T
upjt ≤ ωpt ∀ p ∈ P
}
. (4.13)
The definition of the feasible set above is similar to the one in (4.1), but we only
pay attention to the remaining capacity on day i. In this case, if there is limited
capacity only on day i and the holding cost of scheduling a priority p job that
arrives on day t for day j is cpjt − 1(j 6= i)µ∗j , then we can obtain the optimal
total expected cost by computing the value functions {vit(·) : t ∈ T } through the
optimality equation
vit(xit) = E
{
min
ut∈Ui(xit,ωt)
{∑
j∈T
∑
p∈P
[
cpjt − 1(j 6= i)µ∗j
]
upjt + vi,t+1(xit −
∑
p∈P
upit)
}}
(4.14)
with the boundary condition that vi,τ+1(·) = 0. The optimality equation in (4.14)
is similar to the one in (4.2), but it keeps track of the remaining capacity only on
day i. The subscript i in the value functions emphasizes this. By the discussion
in the previous paragraph, we have z∗LP −
∑
j∈T \{i} µ
∗
j xj1 ≤ vi1(xi1). Furthermore,
the next proposition shows that vi1(xi1) +
∑
j∈T \{i} µ
∗
j xj1 ≤ V1(x1) and we obtain
z∗LP ≤ vi1(xi1) +
∑
j∈T \{i}
µ∗j xj1 ≤ V1(x1).
Noting that the result above holds for any day i, we also have
z∗LP ≤ max
i∈T
vi1(xi1) + ∑
j∈T \{i}
µ∗j xj1
 ≤ V1(x1). (4.15)
Therefore, we can obtain a lower bound on the optimal total expected cost in the
capacity allocation problem by solving the optimality equation in (4.14) and this
lower bound is tighter than the one provided by the optimal objective value of prob-
lem (4.3)-(4.6). We refer to the bound from (4.15) as the dynamic programming
decomposition (DPD) bound.
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Proposition 4.4.1 We have vit(xit) +
∑
j∈T \{i} µ
∗
j xjt ≤ Vt(xt) for all t ∈ T and
all i ∈ T .
Proof We fix i ∈ T and use a standard induction argument over the days of the
planning horizon. The result is easy to show for the last day. We assume that the
result holds for day t + 1 and let {uˆpjt : p ∈ P , j ∈ T } be an optimal solution
to the optimization problem inside the expectation (4.2), ϑt(xt, ωt) be the optimal
objective value of this problem and ϑit(xit, ωt) be the optimal objective value of
the optimization problem inside the expectation in (4.14). We have
ϑt(xt, ωt) =
∑
j∈T
∑
p∈P
cpjt uˆ
p
jt + Vt+1(xt −
∑
j∈T
∑
p∈P
uˆpjt ej)
≥
∑
j∈T
∑
p∈P
cpjt uˆ
p
jt + vi,t+1(xit −
∑
p∈P
uˆpit) +
∑
j∈T \{i}
µ∗j
[
xjt −
∑
p∈P
uˆpjt
]
=
∑
j∈T
∑
p∈P
[
cpjt − 1(j 6= i)µ∗j
]
uˆpjt + vi,t+1(xit −
∑
p∈P
uˆpit) +
∑
j∈T \{i}
µ∗j xjt
≥ ϑit(xit, ωt) +
∑
j∈T \{i}
µ∗j xjt,
where the first inequality follows from the induction assumption and the second
inequality follows from the fact that {uˆpjt : p ∈ P , j ∈ T } is a feasible but not
necessarily an optimal solution to the optimization problem inside the expectation
in (4.14). The result follows by taking expectations in the chain of inequalities
above and noting that Vt(xt) = E{ϑt(xt, ωt)} and vit(xit) = E{ϑit(xit, ωt)}. 2
Proposition 4.4.1 suggests possible approximations to Vt(xt). On the other
hand, since each of {vit(xit) +
∑
j∈T \{i} µ
∗
j xjt : i ∈ T } provides a lower bound
on Vt(xt), it is not clear which of these approximations to use. We propose two
different methods to resolve this ambiguity. First, we consider approximating
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Vt(xt) by
1
|T |
∑
i∈T
vit(xit) + ∑
j∈T \{i}
µ∗j xjt
 , (4.16)
i.e. by averaging all available approximations. To motivate our second approach,
we note that in the approximation of Vt(xt) corresponding to day i, the component
vit(xit) captures the value of the remaining capacity on day i, whereas the compo-
nent
∑
j∈T \{i} µ
∗
j xjt indicates the value of the remaining capacities on days other
than day i. We note that the component
∑
j∈T \{i} µ
∗
j xjt is somewhat trivial in
the sense that it exactly corresponds to how the linear programming formulation
evaluates the capacities on days other than day i. To obtain more sophisticated
estimates for the values of the remaining capacities on days other than day i, we
propose computing {vit(·) : t ∈ T } for all i ∈ T . In this case, given that we are on
day t, the component vit(xit) captures the value of the remaining capacity on day
i and we can use
∑
i∈T vit(xit) as an approximation to Vt(xt). Preliminary simu-
lation runs indicate that this (second) approach to value functions approximation
performs better than the approach suggested by (4.16). Hence, in the compu-
tational results section of this paper, we only report the results obtained using
the second approach and refer to is as the dynamic programming decomposition
(DPD) policy.
In the next section, we re-solve the computational issues that are related to
solving the optimality equation in (4.14).
4.5 Solving the Optimality Equation
The value functions {vit(·) : t ∈ T } computed through the optimality equation in
(4.14) involve a scalar state variable. Therefore, it is straightforward to store these
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value functions. However, solving the optimality equation in (4.14) still requires
dealing with an optimization problem with |P||T | decision variables. The next
proposition shows that the optimization problem inside the expectation in (4.14)
can be solved efficiently.
Proposition 4.5.1 We can solve the optimization problem inside the expectation
in (4.14) by a sort operation.
Proof We let K¯ = maxj∈T {xj1} so that the remaining capacities are always less
than or equal to K¯. By using induction over the days of the planning horizon,
it is possible to show that {vit(·) : t ∈ T } are convex functions in the sense that
2 vit(k) ≤ vit(k+1)+ vit(k−1) for all k = 1, . . . , K¯−1, t ∈ T . In this case, letting
K = {0, . . . , K¯ − 1} and ∆kit = vi,t+1(k + 1)− vi,t+1(k) for all k ∈ K, we associate
the decision variables {wkit : k ∈ K} with the first differences {∆kit : k ∈ K} and
write the optimization problem inside the expectation in (4.14) as
min
∑
j∈T
∑
p∈P
[
cpjt − 1(j 6= i)µ∗j
]
upjt +
∑
k∈K
∆kitw
k
it + vi,t+1(0)
subject to
∑
p∈P
upit +
∑
k∈K
wkit = xit
∑
j∈T
upjt + y
p
t = ω
p
t p ∈ P
wkit ≤ 1 k ∈ K
upjt, y
p
t , w
k
it ∈ Z+ p ∈ P , j ∈ T , k ∈ K,
where we use the slack variables {ypt : p ∈ P} in the second set of constraints
above.
For a particular priority level p, we consider the decision variables {upjt : j ∈
T \ {i}} and ypt in the problem above. As far as the constraints are concerned,
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these decision variables appear only in the second set of constraints. Therefore,
if any one of the decision variables {upjt : j ∈ T \ {i}} and ypt takes a nonzero
value in the optimal solution, then this decision variable has to be the one with the
smallest objective function coefficient. This implies that we can replace all of these
decision variables with a single decision variable, say zpt , and the objective function
coefficient of zpt would be equal to the smallest of the objective function coefficients
of the decision variables {upjt : j ∈ T \ {i}} and ypt . Since the objective function
coefficients of the decision variables {upjt : j ∈ T \ {i}} are {cpjt − µ∗j : j ∈ T \ {i}}
and the objective function coefficient of the decision variable ypt is zero, letting
cˆpt = min{min{cpjt − µ∗j : j ∈ T \ {i}}, 0}, the last problem above becomes
min
∑
p∈P
cpit u
p
it +
∑
p∈P
cˆpt z
p
t +
∑
k∈K
∆kitw
k
it + vi,t+1(0) (4.17)
subject to
∑
p∈P
upit +
∑
k∈K
wkit = xit (4.18)
upit + z
p
t = ω
p
t p ∈ P (4.19)
wkit ≤ 1 k ∈ K (4.20)
upit, z
p
t , w
k
it ∈ Z+ p ∈ P , k ∈ K. (4.21)
Using constraints (4.19), we write zpt = ω
p
t − upit for all p ∈ P and substitute these
decision variables into the objective function to obtain
∑
p∈P
cpit u
p
it +
∑
p∈P
cˆpt
[
ωpt − upit
]
+
∑
k∈K
∆kitw
k
it + vi,t+1(0)
=
∑
p∈P
[
cpit − cˆpt
]
upit +
∑
p∈P
cˆpt ω
p
t +
∑
k∈K
∆kitw
k
it + vi,t+1(0).
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Therefore, dropping the constant term
∑
p∈P cˆ
p
t ω
p
t + vi,t+1(0) from the objective
function, we write problem (4.17)-(4.21) as
min
∑
p∈P
[
cpit − cˆpt
]
upit +
∑
k∈K
∆kitw
k
it (4.22)
subject to
∑
p∈P
upit +
∑
k∈K
wkit = xit (4.23)
upit ≤ ωpt p ∈ P (4.24)
wkit ≤ 1 k ∈ K (4.25)
upit, w
k
it ∈ Z+ p ∈ P , k ∈ K. (4.26)
Problem (4.22)-(4.26) is a knapsack problem with each item consuming one unit
of capacity. The items are indexed by p ∈ P and k ∈ K. The (dis)utilities of
items p ∈ P and k ∈ K are respectively cpit − cˆpt and ∆kit. The capacity of the
knapsack is xit. We can put at most ω
p
t units of item p ∈ P and one unit of
item k ∈ K into the knapsack. The result follows by the fact that a knapsack
problem with each item consuming one unit of capacity can be solved by sorting
the objective function coefficients and filling the knapsack starting from the item
with the smallest objective function coefficient. 2
Another difficulty with the optimality equation in (4.14) is that we need to
compute the expectation of the optimal objective value of the optimization problem
inside the first set of curly brackets. The proof of Proposition 4.5.1 shows that
this optimization problem is equivalent to problem (4.22)-(4.26), which is, in turn,
a knapsack problem, where each item consumes one unit of capacity and there is
a random upper bound on how many units of a particular item we can put into
the knapsack. Powell and Cheung (1994) derive a closed form expression for the
expectation of the optimal objective value of such a knapsack problem. We briefly
describe how their result relates to our setting.
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To reduce the notational clutter, we note that for appropriate choices of the
set of items N = {1, . . . , N}, (dis)utilities {βn : n ∈ N}, integer valued knapsack
capacity Q and integer valued random upper bounds α = {αn : n ∈ N}, problem
(4.22)-(4.26) is a knapsack problem of the form
min
∑
n∈N
βn zn (4.27)
subject to
∑
n∈N
zn = Q (4.28)
zn ≤ αn n ∈ N (4.29)
zn ∈ Z+ n ∈ N . (4.30)
Using ζ(α) to denote the optimal objective value of the problem above as a function
of α, we are interested in computing E{ζ(α)}. For a given realization of α, we can
solve problem (4.27)-(4.30) by sorting the objective function coefficients of the
decision variables and filling the knapsack starting from the item with the smallest
objective function coefficient. We assume that β1 ≤ β2 ≤ . . . ≤ βN , in which case
it is optimal to start from the item with the smallest index.
We let φ(n, q) be the probability that the nth item uses the qth unit of the
available knapsack capacity in the optimal solution. If we know φ(n, q) for all
n ∈ N , q = 1, . . . , Q, then we can compute the expectation of the optimal objective
value of problem (4.27)-(4.30) as
E{ζ(α)} =
Q∑
q=1
∑
n∈N
βn φ(n, q).
Computing φ(n, q) turns out to be not too difficult. Since the optimal solution fills
the knapsack starting from the item with the smallest index, for the nth item to
use the qth unit of capacity in the knapsack, the total capacity consumed by the
first n − 1 items should be strictly less than q and the total capacity consumed
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by the first n items should be greater than or equal to q. Therefore, we have
φ(n, q) = P{α1 + . . . + αn−1 < q ≤ α1 + . . . + αn} and we can compute φ(n, q) as
long as we can compute the convolutions of the distributions of {αn : n ∈ N}.
The discussion in the previous two paragraphs provides a method to compute
the expectation of the optimal objective value of the optimization problem inside
the first set of curly brackets in (4.14). In the next section, we decribe how we
can use the value functions computed through the optimality equation in (4.14) to
make the decisions on each day.
4.6 Applying the Greedy Policies
The discussion at the end of Section 4.4 suggests using
∑
j∈T vjt(xjt) as an approx-
imation to Vt(xt). In this case, if the state of the remaining capacities and the job
arrivals on day t are respectively given by xt and ωt, then we can replace Vt+1(xt−∑
j∈T
∑
p∈P u
p
jt ej) on the right side of (4.2) with
∑
j∈T vj,t+1(xjt −
∑
p∈P u
p
jt) and
solve the problem
min
ut∈U(xt,ωt)
{∑
j∈T
∑
p∈P
cpjt u
p
jt +
∑
j∈T
vj,t+1(xjt −
∑
p∈P
upjt)
}
(4.31)
to make the decisions on day t. The problem above involves |P||T | decision vari-
ables. The next proposition shows that we can efficiently solve this problem as a
min-cost network flow problem.
Proposition 4.6.1 We can solve problem (4.31) as a min-cost network flow prob-
lem.
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Proof As mentioned in the proof of Proposition 4.5.1, it is possible to show that
{vjt(·) : j ∈ T , t ∈ T } are convex functions. In this case, letting K and ∆kjt be
defined as in the proof of Proposition 4.5.1, we associate the decision variables
{wkjt : k ∈ K, j ∈ T } with the first differences {∆kjt : k ∈ K, j ∈ T } and write
problem (4.31) as
min
∑
j∈T
∑
p∈P
cpjt u
p
jt +
∑
j∈T
∑
k∈K
∆kjtw
k
jt
subject to
∑
p∈P
upjt +
∑
k∈K
wkjt = xjt j ∈ T
∑
j∈T
upjt ≤ ωpt p ∈ P
wkjt ≤ 1 k ∈ K, j ∈ T
upjt, w
k
jt ∈ Z+ p ∈ P , k ∈ K, j ∈ T
We define the new decision variables {ypt : p ∈ P} as ypt =
∑
j∈T u
p
jt for all p ∈ P ,
in which case the problem above becomes
min
∑
j∈T
∑
p∈P
cpjt u
p
jt +
∑
j∈T
∑
k∈K
∆kjtw
k
jt (4.32)
subject to
∑
p∈P
upjt +
∑
k∈K
wkjt = xjt j ∈ T (4.33)
∑
j∈T
upjt − ypt = 0 p ∈ P (4.34)
ypt ≤ ωpt p ∈ P (4.35)
wkjt ≤ 1 k ∈ K, j ∈ T (4.36)
upjt, y
p
t , w
k
jt ∈ Z+ p ∈ P , k ∈ K, j ∈ T . (4.37)
The problem above is a min-cost network flow problem. In particular, we consider
a network composed of two sets of nodes N1 = {j ∈ T } and N2 = {p ∈ P}, along
with a sink node. The decision variable upjt corresponds to an arc connecting node
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j ∈ N1 to node p ∈ N2. The decision variable ypt corresponds to an arc connecting
node p ∈ N2 to the sink node. Finally, the decision variable wkjt corresponds to an
arc connecting node j ∈ N1 to the sink node. The supply of node j ∈ N1 is xjt
and constraints (4.33) are the flow balance constraints for the nodes in N1. The
supply of node p ∈ P is zero and constraints (4.34) are the flow balance constraints
for the nodes in N2. The flow balance constraint for the sink node is redundant
and it is omitted. Constraints (4.35) and (4.36) act as simple upper bounds on the
arcs. Figure 4.1 shows the structure of the network for the case where T = {1, 2},
P = {a, b} and K = {k, l}.
Since problem (4.31) can be solved as a min-cost network flow problem, its
continuous relaxation naturally provides integer solutions. 2
wk1,t+1
wl1,t+1
ua1t
ub1t
wk2,t+1
wl2,t+1
ub2t
ua2t
yat
ybt
1
2
a
b
sink
x1t
x2t
Figure 4.1: Network for T = {1, 2}, P = {a, b} and K = {k, l}.
4.7 Computational Experiments
In this section, we compare the performance of the separable value function approx-
imations computed through the method in Section 4.4 with a number of benchmark
105
strategies.
4.7.1 Experimental Setup and Benchmark Strategies
Our experimental setup is based on Erdelyi and Topaloglu (2009a). In particular,
we first generate a base problem and then modify its parameters to obtain test
problems with different characteristics. In the base problem, we have |T | = 100
for the length of the planning horizon, |P| = 3 for the number of priority levels
and S = 7 for the length of the booking horizon. The holding costs are hpjt =
2|P|−p 1.25j−t for all t ∈ T , p ∈ P and j ∈ St where St = {t, . . . , t + S − 1}.
The penalty costs are dpt = β 2
|P|−p 1.25S−1 for all t ∈ T and p ∈ P . In the
base problem, we assume that β = 5. The daily job arrivals for the first, second
and third priority levels are uniformly distributed over [5, 15], [10, 30] and [20, 60],
respectively. We note that this scenario corresponds to a coefficient of variation
equal to 1√
12
∼= 0.3. We assume that the maximum daily processing capacity is
c = 70. We define ρ = 1
c S
∑
s∈S1(c − xs1) so that ρ corresponds to the portion of
the total capacities in the first S days already reserved before job arrivals on day
1 are processed. In the base problem, we assume ρ = 32%.
We compare the performance of the dynamic programming decomposition
(DPD) algorithm introduced in Section 4.4 with three benchmark strategies. Our
first benchmark strategy corresponds to the decision rule described at the end of
Section 4.3. Since this rule employs linear approximations to value functions, we
refer to this strategy as LAX. In addition to the basic version of the algorithm as
explained in Section 4.3, we test a dynamic version of the algorithm where values of
dual variables {µ∗j : j ∈ T } are updated during simulation runs. In particular, we
divide the planning horizon into M equal segments and re-solve (4.3)-(4.6) at time
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periods {tm = b1 + (m − 1)τ/Mc : m = 1, . . . ,M}. We note that that at the be-
ginning of segment m, we replace T in problem (4.3)-(4.6) with Ttm = {tm, . . . , τ}
and the right side of constraints (4.4) with the current remaining daily capacities
{xj,tm : j ∈ Ttm}. Letting {µ∗j : j ∈ Ttm} be the optimal values of dual vari-
ables corresponding to the updated capacity constraints (4.4), we use these when
computing linear approximations to value functions until we reach the beginning
of next segment. For the test problems reported in next section, we tested both
the static version of LAX as well as its dynamic version with M = 5. Since the
dynamic version did not always prove to be an improvement over the static one,
we always report the better of the two performances for each test problem.
The second benchmark strategy we use is a simple first come first serve policy.
Starting with the highest priority jobs and continuing with jobs of lower priority
levels in a descending order, this strategy schedules all jobs to the earliest available
day in the booking horizon. If the policy runs out of space in the booking horizon,
the remaining (not yet scheduled) jobs are denied. We refer to this policy as FC.
Although this strategy is not expected to provide quality results, it can be used as
an indicator of how challenging a particular test problem is.
To motivate our third benchmark strategy, we note that LAX policy uses
the dual solution to the linear program (4.3)-(4.6). Naturally, however, one can
consider using the primal solution to a similar linear program to make capacity
allocation decisions. In particular, at time period t given remaining capacities
{xjt : j ∈ T } and observed job arrivals {ωpt : p ∈ P}, the idea is to consider the
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following linear program
min
∑
s∈Tt
∑
j∈Tt
∑
p∈P
cpjs u
p
js (4.38)
subject to
∑
s∈Tt
∑
p∈P
upjs ≤ xjt j ∈ Tt (4.39)
∑
j∈Tt
upjt ≤ ωpt p ∈ P (4.40)
∑
j∈Tt
upjs ≤ E{ωps} p ∈ P , s ∈ Tt+1 (4.41)
upjs ≥ 0 p ∈ P , j ∈ Tt, s ∈ Tt. (4.42)
We note that the difference between problems (4.3)-(4.6) and (4.38)-(4.42) is that
the latter is only concerned with the portion of the planning horizon starting at
time period t. Furthermore, rather than expected values of job arrivals at time
period t, the program above uses actually observed job arrivals for this time period.
Assuming job arrivals take on their expected values in subsequent time periods, the
optimal solution to the above problem, denoted {u∗jt : j ∈ Tt}, gives the capacity
allocation at time period t. Although this policy is not necessarily optimal with
stochastic job arrivals, we tested it as a benchmark. In several setup runs we
encountered both scenarios when the policy performed relatively well and scenarios
when it performed poorly. Later, we discovered that when the performance of the
strategy is poor, it helped significantly to replace the expected values on the right
side of constraints (4.41) with (random) realizations of job arrivals {ωps : p ∈ P , s ∈
Tt+1}. We refer to the original variant of the method as LPPE and its randomized
version as LPPR. For the test problems reported in next section, we tested both
variants of the policy and always reported the better of the two results. We refer
to this compound policy as LPP.
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4.7.2 Computational Results
Table 4.1 shows the computational results for the base problem. The second col-
umn gives the lower bound on the optimal total expected cost provided by problem
(4.3)-(4.6). The third column gives the estimate of the expected value of the lower
bound provided by the perfect hindsight linear program. We omit reporting the
DPD bounds because it turns out that these are not significantly better than the
bounds obtained from the deterministic linear program. The fourth, fifth, sixth
and seventh columns in this table show the estimates of total expected costs in-
curred by FC, LAX, LPP and DPD, respectively. We estimate these costs by
simulating the performances of different methods under 100 job arrival trajecto-
ries using common random numbers for all methods. The numbers in the brackets
in the second row of these columns indicate the percentage of all jobs rejected by
FC, LAX, LPP and DPD, respectively. We note that, almost exclusively, the low-
est priority jobs are rejected. The eighth column shows the percent gap between
the performance of DPD and FC. Similarly, the ninth and tenth columns show the
performance gaps between DPD and the remaining two methods. The eleventh
column shows the percent gap between the total expected cost incurred by DPD
and the lower bound reported in the third column. Consequently, the eleventh
columns gives an upper bound on the gap between the performances of DPD and
the optimal policy.
Table 4.1: Computational results for the base problem.
Test Lower Bound Total Expected Cost % Gap with DPD DPD
Prob. z(E{d}) E{z(d)} FC LAX LPP DPD FC LAX LPP gap
Base 13,979 14,771 18,747 16,528 17,238 15,885 18.02 4.05 8.52 7.54
(0.02) (2.46) (4.23) (2.05)
The results suggest that DPD performs significantly better than all benchmark
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methods for the base problem. On the other hand, FC performs noticeably worse
than all other methods highlighting the importance of protecting capacity for future
high priority job arrivals. Comparing the performance of LAX and LPP suggests
that LAX performs better, presumably because it does not make a mistake of
rejecting too many jobs. Naturally, the least percentage of jobs is rejected by FC.
This, however, comes at the expense of having too many high priority jobs waiting
too long in the system. Overall, DPD appears to find the best balance between the
percentage of rejected jobs and protecting the capacities for future high priority
jobs. The simulations also confirm that the lower bound E{z∗LP (ω)} is tighter
than the lower bound z∗LP (E{ω}) with a noticeable gap of 5.36% between the two
bounds for the base problem.
In Tables 4.2-4.8, we vary different parameters of the base problem to generate
test problems with modified characteristics. The first columns in these tables
indicate the value of the modified parameter. The interpretations of other columns
in Tables 4.2-4.8 remain the same as in Table 4.1.
Table 4.2: Computational results with varying number of priority levels.
Lower Bound Total Expected Cost % Gap with DPD DPD
N z(E{d}) E{z(d)} FC LAX LPP DPD FC LAX LPP gap
2 11,654 12,574 15,545 14,233 15,184 13,804 12.61 3.11 10.00 9.78
(0.13) (2.53) (4.41) (2.10)
3 13,979 14,771 18,747 16,528 17,238 15,885 18.02 4.05 8.52 7.54
(0.02) (2.46) (4.23) (2.05)
4 17,234 17,893 23,577 19,966 20,108 18,964 24.33 5.28 6.03 5.99
(0.02) (2.58) (4.04) (2.05)
5 19,838 20,520 27,594 22,832 22,656 21,581 27.86 5.80 4.98 5.17
(0.00) (2.63) (4.07) (2.19)
In Table 4.2, we vary the number of priority levels. We note that DPD performs
consistently better than all benchmark strategies for all test problems although
the performance gap between DPD and LPP decreases with increasing number of
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priority levels.
In Table 4.3, we vary the length of the booking horizon. Again, DPD is notice-
ably better than FC and LAX for all test problems. However, for longer booking
horizons, DPD is outperformed by LPP. We note that the strong performance of
LPP for large booking horizons is obtained due to LPPE which not typical as,
for most test problems, LPPR performs better that LPPE. We deduce that LPPE
benefits from longer booking horizons as it allows the policy to avoid the mistake
of rejecting too many jobs if the capacities appear tight.
Table 4.3: Computational results with varying booking horizon length.
Lower Bound Total Expected Cost % Gap with DPD DPD
S z(E{d}) E{z(d)} FC LAX LPP DPD FC LAX LPP gap
3 11,994 13,018 14,390 14,217 15,063 14,012 2.70 1.46 7.50 7.64
(0.72) (1.31) (6.89) (1.04)
5 12,566 13,590 16,417 15,197 16,426 14,722 11.51 3.23 11.57 8.33
(0.21) (1.65) (6.15) (1.32)
7 13,979 14,771 18,747 16,528 17,238 15,885 18.02 4.05 8.52 7.54
(0.02) (2.46) (4.23) (2.05)
9 16,527 16,936 21,390 20,075 17,810 17,885 19.60 12.24 -0.42 5.60
(0.00) (1.68) (2.63) (1.96)
11 19,977 20,374 24,448 24,424 20,972 21,578 13.30 13.19 -2.81 5.91
(0.00) (0.84) (1.87) (1.19)
In Table 4.4, we vary the coefficient of variation for the job arrivals. DPD
performs significantly better than all benchmark methods and the performace gap
between DPD and both LAX and LPP increases with increasing variation. This is
encouraging because addressing temporal dynamics of job arrivals was one of the
goals behind developing the DPD rule.
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Table 4.4: Computational results with varying coefficient of variation values.
Lower Bound Total Expected Cost % Gap with DPD DPD
CV z(E{d}) E{z(d)} FC LAX LPP DPD FC LAX LPP gap
0.0 13,979 13,979 17,867 13,979 13,979 13,979 27.81 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (2.40) (2.40) (2.40)
0.1 13,979 14,154 17,891 14,637 14,992 14,411 24.15 1.57 4.03 1.82
(0.00) (2.41) (2.89) (2.23)
0.2 13,979 14,380 18,099 15,434 15,985 14,991 20.73 2.96 6.63 4.25
(0.00) (2.42) (3.42) (2.16)
0.3 13,979 14,771 18,747 16,528 17,238 15,885 18.02 4.05 8.52 7.54
(0.02) (2.46) (4.23) (2.05)
0.4 13,979 15,222 19,515 17,718 18,549 16,909 15.41 4.78 9.70 11.08
(0.16) (2.52) (5.16) (1.96)
0.5 13,979 15,810 20,455 19,251 20,135 18,325 11.62 5.05 9.88 15.91
(0.41) (2.70) (6.33) (1.93)
In Table 4.5, we vary the daily available capacity. We note that with increasing
capacity, the problem becomes less challenging and the performance gaps between
different policies become negligible as all policies perform close to the optimal
policy. By contrast, with tighter capacities, the problem becomes more challenging
and it is encouraging that DPD then outperforms LAX and LPP by a wider margin.
On the other hand, it appears that for very tight capacities, the test problem again
becomes somewhat less challenging and the performances of all three non-trivial
policies level up and approach the performance of optimal policy.
Table 4.5: Computational results with varying daily available capacities.
Lower Bound Total Expected Cost % Gap with DPD DPD
c z(E{d}) E{z(d)} FC LAX LPP DPD FC LAX LPP gap
55 34,841 34,930 57,896 37,428 36,524 35,868 61.41 4.35 1.83 2.69
(18.22) (20.11) (20.13) (18.75)
65 20,023 20,365 36,237 24,688 23,828 21,588 67.86 14.36 10.38 6.01
(3.58) (9.33) (9.59) (6.92)
70 13,979 14,771 18,747 16,528 17,238 15,885 18.02 4.05 8.52 7.54
(0.02) (2.46) (4.23) (2.05)
75 11,858 12,218 12,515 12,746 12,265 12,305 1.71 3.58 -0.33 0.71
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
85 11,342 11,389 11,448 11,459 11,396 11,397 0.45 0.54 -0.01 0.07
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
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Table 4.6: Computational results with varying holding costs.
Lower Bound Total Expected Cost % Gap with DPD DPD
φ z(E{d}) E{z(d)} FC LAX LPP DPD FC LAX LPP gap
1.2 10,111 10,841 12,578 11,997 13,241 11,645 8.01 3.02 13.71 7.42
(0.02) (2.46) (4.04) (2.03)
2.0 13,979 14,771 18,747 16,528 17,238 15,885 18.02 4.05 8.52 7.54
(0.02) (2.46) (4.23) (2.05)
3.0 20,489 21,260 29,064 24,119 23,772 22,638 28.39 6.54 5.01 6.48
(0.02) (2.46) (4.24) (2.04)
4.0 28,859 29,595 42,278 33,850 32,150 31,131 35.81 8.73 3.27 5.19
(0.02) (2.46) (4.24) (2.03)
In Tables 4.6 and 4.7, we vary the holding and the penalty costs. We work with
holding costs of the form hpjt = φ
3−p 1.25j−t for all t ∈ T , p ∈ P and j ∈ St and
penalty costs of the form dpt = β φ
3−p 1.256 for all t ∈ T and p ∈ P . We recall that
the base case corresponds to φ = 2 and β = 5. We observe that DPD in general
significantly outperforms all other methods. The only exception is the performance
of LPP method for a test problem with very large penalty costs. Again, this can
be explained by the earlier observation that the LPP policy in general tends to
reject more jobs than it would be optimal. However, it appears that for extremely
high penalty costs, the LPP policy avoids making this mistake.
Table 4.7: Computational results with varying penalty costs.
Lower Bound Total Expected Cost % Gap with DPD DPD
β z(E{d}) E{z(d)} FC LAX LPP DPD FC LAX LPP gap
2.0 12,194 13,074 18,729 14,697 14,944 14,372 30.32 2.26 3.98 9.93
(0.02) (2.46) (8.24) (2.13)
4.0 13,384 14,286 18,741 15,918 17,064 15,383 21.83 3.48 10.93 7.68
(0.02) (2.46) (5.63) (2.06)
5.0 13,979 14,771 18,747 16,528 17,238 15,885 18.02 4.05 8.52 7.54
(0.02) (2.46) (4.23) (2.05)
6.0 14,575 15,195 18,753 17,138 16,813 16,378 14.50 4.64 2.66 7.79
(0.02) (2.46) (2.95) (2.03)
8.0 15,413 15,904 18,765 19,107 16,771 16,829 11.50 13.54 -0.34 5.82
(0.02) (0.81) (1.80) (1.15)
Finally, in Table 4.8, we vary the parameter corresponding to the initial ca-
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pacity occupancy. We conclude that DPD consistently outperforms all benchmark
strategies independently of the value of ρ.
Table 4.8: Computational results with varying initial occupancy.
Lower Bound Total Expected Cost % Gap with DPD DPD
ρ z(E{d}) E{z(d)} FC LAX LPP DPD FC LAX LPP gap
0.00 11,160 12,925 13,783 13,783 14,997 13,469 2.33 2.33 11.34 4.21
(0.00) (0.00) (2.33) (0.00)
0.16 13,801 14,579 18,106 16,347 17,008 15,686 15.43 4.21 8.43 7.59
(0.02) (2.31) (4.02) (1.86)
0.32 13,979 14,771 18,747 16,528 17,238 15,885 18.02 4.05 8.52 7.54
(0.02) (2.46) (4.23) (2.05)
0.50 15,622 16,382 24,388 18,263 18,799 17,517 39.22 4.26 7.32 6.93
(0.20) (3.88) (5.49) (3.40)
0.70 17,694 18,399 31,773 20,292 20,603 19,513 62.83 3.99 5.59 6.05
(0.70) (5.35) (6.77) (4.83)
4.8 Conclusion
In this paper, we considered a capacity allocation problem that involves allocating a
fixed amount of daily processing capacity to jobs of different priority levels arriving
randomly over time. While finding the optimal policy would involve solving a
dynamic program with a large number of state variables, we proposed a dynamic
programming decomposition idea, which required solving dynamic programs with
only one state variable. Computational results indicated that the decomposition
policy performs significantly better than alternative policies.
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Chapter 5
Summary
In this thesis, we develop dynamic programming decomposition methods for ca-
pacity allocation and network revenue management problems. We demonstrate
that our approach in general gives rise to two important results. First, the sug-
gested decomposition methods are useful in providing tight bounds on optimal
total expected values of the underlying optimization problems. Second, the poli-
cies implied by the value functions approximations generated by the decomposition
methods significantly outperform a variety of known benchmark strategies.
In Chapter 2, we consider a network revenue management problem in which the
airline is assumed to perform capacity allocation and overbooking decisions jointly.
We demonstrate that, by concentrating on one flight leg at a time, it is possible to
obtain approximate solutions to the dynamic programming formulation of the un-
derlying revenue optimization problem. These approximate solutions are obtained
by solving a sequence of single leg revenue optimization problems. Furthermore,
we show that a state aggregation technique can be used to obtain tractable high
quality solutions to the single leg problems. Overall, our model constructs separa-
ble approximations to the value functions, which can be used to make the capacity
allocation and overbooking decisions for the whole airline network. Computational
experiments indicate that our model performs significantly better than a variety
of benchmark strategies from the literature.
In Chapter 3, we consider a network revenue management problem in which the
airline is assumed to control prices of its offered itineraries. Specifically, we consider
a setting where the probability of observing a request for an itinerary depends on
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the prices and the objective is to dynamically adjust the prices so that the total
expected revenue is maximized. We construct two different approximations to value
functions of the dynamic programming formulation of this pricing problem. Both
methods share the idea of decomposing the dynamic programming formulation by
the flight legs and obtaining value function approximations by focusing on one flight
leg at a time. We show that our methods provide upper bounds on the optimal
total expected revenue and these upper bounds are tighter than the one provided
by a deterministic linear program commonly used in practice. Our computational
experiments yield two important results. First, our methods provide substantial
performance improvements over the deterministic linear program. Second, the two
methods that we develop have different strengths. In particular, while one method
is able to obtain tighter upper bounds, the other one is able to obtain pricing
policies that yield higher total expected revenues.
In Chapter 4, we consider a capacity allocation problem with a fixed amount
of daily processing capacity. Jobs of different priorities arrive randomly over time
and need to be scheduled for processing. The jobs that are waiting to be processed
incur a holding cost depending on their priority levels and the length of the sched-
uled waiting period. The goal is to minimize the total expected cost over a finite
planning horizon. We propose an approximation method that decomposes the dy-
namic programming problem by booking days and solves a sequence of single-day
capacity allocation problems. We show that this approach both provides a lower
bound on the optimal total expected costs and can be used to make capacity allo-
cation decisions. Computational experiments indicate that our method performs
significantly better than a variety of benchmark strategies.
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